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CHAPTER I
BIOLOGICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
Hurt Koffka, in his took, "The Growth of the i/.ind", de-
fines the problem of psychology as, "the Problem of
Psychology
scientific study of the behavior of living
creatures in contact with the outer world."' In his use of the
term, "outer world" he does not discredit introspective data,
whic b he considers ss "descriptive concepts" or experiential
observation"
.
xhere are at present two outstanding and conflicting
schools of psychology. The behaviorist is concerned only
with facts which anyone can determine. The importance of
these real facts or functional concepts cannot be denied. To
do so would eventuate in ignoring scientific methods and prin
ciples. -.owever, it must be granted taat there are certain
facts whica only tae experiencer can determine. These facts
are called experiences, descriptive concepts or consciousness
Functional concepts are quantitative and can therefore be
measured or counted , while descriptive concepts are qualita-
tive and cannot be controlled or measured.
In this scientific age of efficiency tne cry is apt to
be "quantity" rattier than "quality". :7e Behaviorism
ask, "what can a child do?" rather than in-
'xloff^a, iCurt, The ^rowth of the Llind
,
p. 4.
^Ibid.
,
p. b.

<iuire into the motives that prompted his action. .v'hat a
child car do can be easily measured and tabulated, but it im-
possible to measure way he did certain things. Assuming that
the behavior istic point of view is the correct one, we lave
only to control the environment or stimuli and the results
can be accurately predicted. ,'atson denies the truth of this
assertion, but the whole trend of his psychology indieatee
that it is based on a similar assumption. Shi psychologist
is merely a second Alladin. he needs only to rub the magic
lamp, thereby controlling the environment, and the result is
a perfected machine. Ihis human machine would satisfy one
important criterion of our age--eff iciency . Ah efficient
society of machines would soon become monotonous as there is
no place for creat ivit.y or novelty.
fihe gestalt psychologist and self psychologist recog-
nize the i iportance of controlling environment, but they in-
sist that taere are many factors that enter into the forma-
tion of a person. A person is both soc- Oestslt
Psychology
ial and individual. Ee is social insofar-
as he is influenced "by the thoughts and actions of others,
and in turn reflects his own thoughts in his actions, temper-
ament and facial expressions. A person is individual in that
one self can never be identified witn another self. llr. A
can never be Mr. B because ais experiences are not identical
i
with those of Kr. B. .
'i.arlatt, Sari, Lecture .otes.
c
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Since we can never fully know another self we will never
be able to judge accurately the motives that Lotives
prompted him to certain actions. It is often
difficult for an individual himself to determine accurately
what motives caused him to do certain things. 7/hen asked to
give reasons for his behavior he searches madly for valid ex-
cuses, liot long ago a woman was on the point of committing
suicide by jumping into Lake Michigan. A policeman who saw
her ordered her not to jump, saying he would shoot her if she
did. Ihe woman, who was fully prepared to die by drowning,
did as the policeman commanded. .Vhen questioned later she
could give bo valid reasons for her action. If we are unable
to assign valid motives for our own actions, how much less can
we judge the motives prompting other people's actions.'
The problem with which this paper is concerned is not so
muca the actual beaavior of living creatures in their contact
with the outer world, as with txie habits ana motives that pre-
cede action or beaavior. Behavior may be due to achievement
or it may be the end-product of real facts and experiences. I
am concerned mainly with the factors leading up to action or
inhibition.
A psychologist must be interested in the contributions
given to science by evolutionary theories. Tnomson states, "if
matter is dynamic, surely living substance cannot be less so."'
He states further that, "all substance is essentially one, is
dynamic, different only in the coordination and configuration
'Thomson, 1,1. K.
,
i'he Springs of Human Action, p. £1
c
of this primordial dynamic world stuff."' It would indeed "be
strange if everything in the world had pro- Psy chotropic
^volu^ion
gressed cut man. & study of skeletons shows
without a doubt that the physical structure of human beings
has changed considerably, There has evidently been a corres-
ponding, if not greater, change in the mind of human beings.
Man has attained his place in the evolutionary scale because
he has relied on his mind rather than his body to pull him
tn.rough strategic situations. Except for an occasional prize
fight, it can be said that physical prowess is more or less
tabooed, j/ven in football a man who uses his brains is pre-
ferred over a man that relies exclusively on his physical
strength. Anile strong bodies are to be commended, strong
minds are more of an asset. The boy who is a bully is rep-
rimanded and nis actions inhibited, while the boy who gains
the same ends by scheming is encouraged. We must accept the
fact that evolution is upward toward the mind, and that mind
has been the determining factor in this process.
It is a difficult tasLt to explain how man has progressed
to his present positior.--much more difficult than to prove
that he has actually progressed. There are et present three
theories that attempt to explain the "how" of evolution. The
eugenists hold that progress is dependent Eugenics
upon better breeding. What a person is and does depends on
'Thomson, M. K. , The Springs of Human Action, p. 22
Mathews, A. P., The Road to ^volution, pp. 34C-352.

who his ancestors were. Darwin might "be called the first
eugenist. Ee was followed "by Mendel, who found that there
are certain dominant and certain recessive characters in the
germ plasm. Recessive characters can yield only recessive
characters, while the uniting of dominant and recessive char-
acters results in three times as many dominant characters as
recessive ones. His conclusions are fairly valid for physical
characters, but mental characters are so complicated and num-
erous it is almost impossible to determine just which ones
are dominant and which receosive. In addition, there are so
many possible combinations in which the genes of one cell may
be united with those in another, it is impossible to predict
With any certainty the resulting individual.
Weismann held that the gjrm plasm is continuous from one
generation to another and cannot be affected in any way by the
individual's own efforts. Galton advanced the taeory that we
are affected by our ancestors in direct proportion to t>ieir
remoteness to us. An attempt to explain progress from a purely
eugenic point of view can lead only to determinism, which has
no place for individual or group effort to better society. A
child cannot choobe his ancestors and can therefore not be held
responsible for his own actions. It eventuates in a convenient
philosophy for an indolent and irresponsible individual.
Diametrically opposed to eugenics stand the environmental-
ists, who insist that progress can only be effected by improving
i.larlatt, Jarl
t
Lecture Notes

living conditions. Ike problem of race improvement is there-
fore one of controlling environment. ijnvironmentali sm
Both the behaviorists and the environ-
mentalists claim tiist heredity is not important, or even a
determining factor in progress. ".Vatson says he doesn't care
who a men's ancestors were. "I ask only for a squirming baby,
ready to be snaped by any family in which it is placed. Hered-
ity in the sense of instincts and inborn traits must go until
other facts are produced to substantiate it."' The environ-
mentalists fail to take account of the fact that, "we cannot
gather figs from thistles." iheir theory eventuates in
positivism. It too is a convenient philosophy because a per-
son can blame his parents, teachers and associates for the
environment in which he was placed.
j/ugenists and environmentalists "both fail to explain
progress in that each refuses to accept facts advsnced "by the
otaer. The eugenists have no explanation for creativity and
the environmentalists are unable to explain adequately feeble-
mindedness. Both fail to give an altogether adequate explana-
tion of the startling differences between children in the
same family. Ihey have had the same ancestors and aave been
subjected to very nearly the same environment and yet they
may be different in mental ability, likes and dislikes and
physical characteristics.
'.Vatson, J. B.
,
The Behaviorist Looks at Instincts, Harpers,
July, 1927, xjp. £30-3
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Stern has advanced a taird theory, which attempts to recon-
cile the eugenists and environmentalists.
Convergence
This is the Convergence Theory, It holds theory
that, "mental development is not a mere passive unfolding of
inborn traits, neither is it a mere reception of external
influences; instead, it is a result of the convergence of
both the internal opportunities end the external conditions
4
of development. One should not ask, concerning any function
or trait, whether it originates from within or without; for
"both are constantly co-operating in the work, though at times
in varying degrees."
Xoffka is inclined to accept Stern's theory, although
he states that, "until the problems of experience and learn-
ing have been solved it will be impossible to know the re-
lationship between heredity and environment." Certainly the
open-minded psychologist cannot stress eitaer eugenics or
environment exclusively. The Convergence Theory recognizes
both, and at the same time leaves room for individual effort
and responsibility. If we are to accept the psychotropic
tneory of evolution it follows that we must accept the Con-
vergence Theory as both lead to freedom of the will.
Hand in hand with the struggle of the nativists vs the
empiricists has gone a second struggle, the phylogenists vs
the ontogenists. Ontogenesis is concerned with the develop-
ment of tae individual, while phylogenesis is concerned with
'Stern, ./illiam, Psychology of ^arly Childhood, p. 50
^Xoffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 52.
<l
6.
the development of the race. The part race history plays
in individual development aaa long been Ontogenesis
vs.
a bone of contention for educators. ifhyiogenes is
oome educators have insisted that the child recapitulates
the race. In other words, a child passes through all the
stages previously experienced "by the race. I have heard
religious educators insist that we should tell Did 'feste-
ment stories to children for the sole reason that they have
reached in their development a stage corresponding to that
held "by the Israelites. The fact that many of the concepts
are unethical and unchristian is of no importance since
the child will discard such concepts waen he recapitulates
the Christian Zrs.
The second theory is utility, which "attributes racial
and individual development to the same Ut ility
causes. Development is the result of the operation of two
principles—accidental variation and the selection of ap-
propriate responses."' iais theory is "based directly on Ueo-
Darwinism and stands or falls with lieo-Larwinism.
It is impossible to prove that an individual recapitu-
lates the race, u >less it is in the embryological stage,
which is outside the psycholor ist ' s field. Obviously it is
unscientific to "base a curriculum on such a theory. Ihe par-
ental instinct, which must have appeared early in the race is
Koffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Hind, p. 45
i.larlatt, Earl, Lecture Notes.
tC 1 I
one of the latest instincts to appear. The theory of Util-
ity is tossed on chance variation and cannot "be accepted
since it is contrary to the psychotropic theory of evolution.
The third theory is Correspondence which maintains
that phylogenesis and ontogenesis sre Correspondence
closely related processes. "Since each has to go with the
development of organisms, it is highly probable that certain
general caaracter istics of development play a dominating
part 'both in ontogenesis and in phylogenesis .... One may ex-
pect that ali. the beginning -stages in any course of evolu-
tion will actually be of a similar nature, and that t lis
similarity will apply equally to primitive levels, to more
progressive levels, and even to the highest levels of de-
velopment."' This third theory seems more tenable inasmuch
as it agrees fairly well with observable facts.
Let us furn for a moment to investigate tne nervous
system of a baby. Xoffks and Jcinger Ihe Nervous
System
differentiate two parts of tae central
nervous system; "one of these, found in all vertebrates, ful-
fils the function of the central apparatus in that it receives
sensory inroulses, and sends out motor impulses, ihe appara-
tus consists of the long spinal cord, which cortinues into
the medulla oblongata, and also a series of brain parts,
among which the cerebellum, the hind brain, tic mid-brain,
and the olfactory lobes may be named. This is the "old
XoffJca, Kurt, The Growth of the r.ind
,
p. 4 6
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brain". The new brain is the cerebrum and the cortex."' It
will be found that the "new brain" grows quite rapidly during
the early part of a child's life. Aft 91 the fifth year the
rate of growtr: decreases very materially, and in about the
a.
thirty-fifth year ceases entirely.
The unit of the nervous system is the neurone. It is
composed of a central cell and numerous processes taat extend
in all directions from that cell body. V/ithin the body is a
nucleus and a nucleolus. ±'ae processes extending from the
neurones are axons and dendrites, The axons are long, contain
few branches and conduct impressions away from the cell.. The
dendrites are on the whole very short (usually about one milli-
meter in length) , heve many branches and conduct impress!one
to the cell. Both the dendrites and axons terminate in end
brushes. 1'he connection between the axons and dendrites is
called a synapse. More will be said of the synapse after a
fuller description of the nervous system has teen given.
The spinal cord extends two-thivda of the way down the
spinal column and is encased by it. The center of the cord is
grey, while the outside of the cord is white. Above the spinal
core is the brain stem, which is composed of the cerebellum,
the corpora quadr igemina , the thalamus and the pons. In the
medulla there is a crossing of part of the fibres that extend
3
from the cerebrum to the spinal cord. This means that the left
side of the brain controls the right bide of the body and vice
versa.
'Koffka, Kurt, The Growth of the ilina, p. 23
Ibid.
,
p. 58
3Pillsbury, V. B. , The fundamentals of Psychology
,
pp. 20-25
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The function of the cerebellum is to coordinate mus-
cular movements. l..ore explicitly, "it "brings together sen-
sory impressions concerned in movement, properly graduates
them and sends out impulses which shall control tae lower
reflexes, check some, increase others ana make all work to-
gether." 1 The corpora quadrigemins is the centre for re-
flexes of the eyes, and probably for movements of the head,
ihe thalamus is, "a way station for impulses from the skin
and other sense organs in their course to the cortex. It aas
recently been found to be closely connected with emotional
expressions .
"
.-.bove the brsin stem is the cerebrum which is devided
into two so.is res. ^ach sphere is, in turn, divided into five
lobes--the frontal, temporal, parietal, occipital snd island
of Bail* The cerebrum is composed of white matter, and in
it are many nerves connecting with the spinal c^rd and con-
necting one Hemisphere of the cerebrum with the other. Cov-
ering the cerebrum is a thin sheet of grey matter, tae cor-
tex. Iha cortex is composed of millions of cells arranged in
3
folds. It is in the cerebrum and especially in the cortex
that mental processes are carried on. "The cortex is the
part in whica the final coordinations toke place and which is
most closely related to consciousness.
'iCoffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind, c. 5b
^Pillsbury, <7. B. , The fundamentals of Psychology, p. 59
^Athesrn, 1\ 5. , Lecture Notes
YPillsbury, ;/. B , The fundamentals of Psychology, p. 65
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John Locke conceived of the mind as being divided into
eight pockets, each of which contained a faculty such as
perception, judgment, reason, will, memory, etc. Disciplin-
ary subjects were taught exclusively in the schools as it
was thought these developed the faculties more rapidly than
subjects that were strictly useful.'
More recent psychologists have discarded faculty psy-
chology for functional psychology. functional
PsycaTl ogy
They have found that different functions
are localized in definite parts of the brain. In one part
of the brain is located the speeca area, in another part the
touch area, etc. This necessitated a change in public school
curriculum and more practical subjects were introduced. As
Lean Athearn expresses it, "a man can develop his jaw by
chewing rubber, and he can also develop it by chewing beef
steak. In the first instance there is only s develoced jaw,
while in the second there is a developed jaw plus nutriment.
Many psychologists compare the nervous system to a tele
phone excna;';,,, e . A sensory or afferent Associations! ism
nerve is stimulated and the stimulus is relayed tarough the
spinal cord to the cortex. In the cortex are located most o
the association centres. It acts as the "central" in tne
telepnone system, and makes the proper connections with the
motor or efferent nerves, ihese in turn stimulate the muscl
and cause taem to contract. It should be noted that the
'Ataearn, W. o. , Lecture Lotes.
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energy which is released is not the energy in the stimulus
"but rather the potential energy stored up in the nerves.
Ho% all nervous impulses go to the cortex, as some of the
connections are made in the spinal cord and brain stem. If
the association is made for the first time in the cortex,
(this would imply a conscious association or action) sub-
sequent connections are probably made in the cortex, although
they need not be conscious.
After a nerve current has once passed over a certain
group of dendrites and axones a path is formed, Stimulus
Response
and each subsequent repetition becomes pro- Bonds
portionately easier. The first time a nerve current passed
over a group of dendrites the synapses served as a "stop
sign" for the impulse, ^ach repetition tended to reduce the
resistance until finally an open path was formed. If there
were several possible reactions the response was determined
by, "the degree of openness of the synapses between different
neurones."' According to Thorndike the laws of recency, fre-
quency and satisfaction operate in the fixation of the re-
sponse. However, it sometimes happens that a response brings
satisfaction for a time, end then suddenly brings dissatis-
faction. This dissatisfaction may be due to punishment, over
indulgence or failure. A resistance is set up at the synapse
causing a different response to be made to a certain stimulus
This is the justification for punishment. Theoretically, a
Pillsbury, Iff. E. , The fundamentals of I sychology
,
p. 61.
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child is punished, not for what he has done, "but to pre-
vent a recurrence of the undesirable response. In other
words, it is hoped that the punishment will set up a strong
"stop sign" at the critical synapse and lead to a redirec-
tion of the response.
In contrast to the stimulus-response explanation for
beaavior Hurt iloffka offers a novel ex- Seat alt
Psych ology
planation, the gestalt psychology. He
maintains that "physiological £)rocesses take piece "both in
the form of "closed" and "unclosed" responses."' "A stimu-
lus upsets an equilibrium on the receptive side ox the
system; this upset equilibrium results in a movement which
tends to bring the system to a new equilibrium and conse-
quently the reaction must vary wit a the way in which the
equilibrium was disturbed. Jvery response is the result of
a disturbed equilibrium and we can predict that a certain
response will be in the direction of a new equilibrium since
every process in nature must comply with this law."** This
means that one or more stimuli cause a disequilibrium of
the organism as a .hole, and the whole organism responds to
the situation, The sensory and motor nerves are not separate,
but rather constitute a unitary system. The old conception
of stimulus--response need not be discarded entirely, as "it
is still conceivable that the fixation of a function may go
'iCoffka, Hurt, The Growth of the Mifid, p. 9 7
^Zoffka, Hurt. Mental Development, Psychologies of 1925, p. 138
(
15.
hand in hand with the fixation of an organ as it develops a
system within which the process can ta^e place in a relative-
ly independent manner. But even so, the apparatus itself
would not be the cause, out the consequence of this icind of
functioning, The existence of such an apparatus therefore
lends no weight to any argument for the older theory, or
against the newer one." "We shall have to conceive the
physiological process in such a way that the conclusion of the
activity involves a peculiar condition towards which, for
physical reasons the whole process is directed."' "Viihat hap-
pens at one point in the organism is never independent of
what happens in another. "
a~
A "brief explanation should be given of "closed" and "un-
closed" responses. A closed response is any Closed and
Unclosed
activity which has "been carried to a satis- Responses
factory conclusion, and e state of equilibrium attained. Pew
responses are actually "closed" as new stimuli continually ap-
pear to upset the equilibrium of an organism. A response can
hardly be said to be due to one stimulus only. One stimulus
merely breaks in on an "unclosed" response and the new response
is the result of the previous "unclosed" response and the new
stimulus. An unclosed response can best be explained by com-
paring it to the open triangle, suggested by Aoffka. The di-
rection of the lines in the open triangle "indicate with a
relatively high degree of certainty the direction in which
Xofffca, Aurt, Ihe Growth of the Mind, p. 109
^Ibid .
,
p. 80
'II
V
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the closure is to be effected."'
ihe present is continually changing and we are there-
fore continually passing through a tran- Cental
t titudes
sitory state, ihe direction of the clos-
ure is determined to a large extent "by the type of situation
to which the individual must respond and the mental a tt itud
e
of the person. A fuller description and discussion of gestalt
psychology will be givan in subsequent chapters.
Koffjca, Zurt, 'ihe Growth of the Mind, p. 103
f)
PART II
n
CHAPTEB II
FACTORS IlfYOLVSD IB LEABHIUG
The "new brain" or cerebrum plays an important 'part in
the development ox the individual. As it "New Brain"
increases in size tnere is a corresponding
increase in the intelligence of the child, The "old brain"
becomes more and more dependent upon the work of the "new
brain". At birth the "new brain" of a baby is in an unfin-
ished state, as the fibres of the brain possess no sheathing
and are therefore incapable of functioning. "Medulation
first takes place principally in the fibres extending from
the cortex, and upon whose functioning the voluntary motion
of the limes is dependent. Later it extends to the fibres
that connect the various cortical areas."' There is a paral-
lel development between the growth of the brain and the co-
ordination of the muscles of t.ie body. However, all parts of
the brain do not develop with equal rapidity, even as the body
does not grow at a uniform rate.
In addition to the early random movements there are a
number of simple coordinated reactions called reflexes. The
reflexes -lave very definite characteristics: Reflexes
1. The stimuli and reactions are simple.
Xoffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 57
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£. The movements are uniform
3. Variation of stimulus in a certain direction does
not necessarily mean alteration of response.
4. The movements are inherited and do not have to be
learned.
5. The movements are useful to the organism.
6. The reation can be facilitated or inhibited by ap-
plying another stimulus at another point.
All psychologists would undoubtedly accept these cri-
teria for determining what movements are reflexive, but they
would not be in agreement regarding the operation of the re-
flexes or the relation between reflexive, instinctive and
conscious behavior.
The generally accepted theory is that the reflex-arc is
composed of at least one sensory neurone and one motor neurone.
The stimulus releases a certain amount of Reflex Arc
energy, which has been stored up in the sen-
sory neurone. This released energy or impulse serves as a
stimulus to release potential energy, which has been stored
up in the motor nerve. The reflex is tne basis of all be-
havior, in that all higher forms develop from the reflexes.
o--A bonds are formed -between the sensory and motor nerves.
Learning consists of the maturation of existing bonds, or the
forming of new connections between sensory and motor nerves.
'iZoffka, Aurt , The Growth of the Hind, pp. 67-6.
i<
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Learning can never be essentially new as it is dependent
upon existing "bonds already established.
A concrete example of a simple reflex will serve to
show the difference between this old theory and the new one
proposed by Xurt Koffka. Tk* move- gye Movements
ments of the eyes have long been a
source of controversy. In a new-born infant the two eyes
are sometimes coordinated and sometimes one eye moves inde-
pendently of the other. V.'hen the eye movements are from the
first coordinated it would seem that tne movements were in-
herited. ..hen they converge after a time it would seem that
it was due to practice. ITha first theory is that of the
nativist, which holds that beaavior is based on "pre-determined
,
inherited dispositions. Practice and experience serve to per-
i
fact behavior, but introduce no new forms." The empiricist
insists that, "the essential features of behavior are con-
ceived to be the result of practice. !T ' Most of the psycholo-
gists take account of both inheritance and practice, refus-
ing to assign greater importance to eitaer of them.
If an infant fixes its gaze on a certain object, which
is moved from one place to another, his eyes will follow
the moving object. 'Ihis requires many innervations of the
'iloffka, Xurt, ihe Growth of the Llind, p. 72.
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eye muscles, "which are determined by the position of t.ae
retinsl points which arouse the movement and "by the pre-
existing position of the eyes.'' "If we accept the old
theory of neural connections it means that every sensory
fibre must possess as many connections with the motor nerves
as may "be required for all possible positions of the eyes."'
The sensory and motor nerves are distinct entities, but are
bound together by many synapses.
In o position to this view, Hurt Koffka states that
"eye-movements are determined to a very considerable extent
by the characteristics of the visual phenomena which are in-
volved. " Ihe sensory and motor nerves ere not separate , but
are a unitary organ. "We can no longer assume that the
sensory function serves merely to release the motor function
without involving any inner or material connection between
the two. The hypothesis is advanced that the specific pat-
tern of the seen-object itself regulates the movements of
3
the eye." The stimulus throws the organism in a state of
dis-equilibrium which causes movements of the eyes until
equilibrium is again established. fihe movement of the eyes
is due to the specific qualities of the object seen and not
to any mechanism composed of sensory and motor nerves.
It has long been thought that instincts were a step
higher than reflexive movements. .Vat son Instincts
does riot have any difficulty in explaining instincts for the
fcoffka, Hurt, ihe Growth of the Mind, p. 77
"Ibid.
,
p. 79
Ibid.
, p. 60
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reason that he refuses to "believe that instincts exist or
have been inherited. He is willing to admit that animal
behavior is largely controlled by instincts, but "merely
because man has an evolutionary history is no sign he has
instincts like the stock from which he sprang..* The
eugenists are responsible for the spreading of the theory
of instincts, which Watson considers more dangerous than
Bolshevism. "Heredity in the sense of instincts and in-
born traits must go ur<til other facts are produced to sub-
stantiate it. %at a child becomes is not in any way de-
termined by heredity, but is rather due to patterns, acci-
dents of environment and the emotional fixation of his
adopted parents."
Thorndike, and in -i^ct practically every psychologist,
takes account of instincts, They do not, however, agree
on an exact definition of instincts or a classification of
them. The uniformity, universality and complexity of in-
stincts make it impossible to disregard them entirely, or
assume t:iat they are due to mere conditioning.
'j.norndike defines instincts as "a series of chained re-
flexet,." One reflex starts an instinc- Instincts as
uhained
tive action, which is in turn a stimulus Refl exe s
for a new act. "The response is determined unequivocally by
f
the order and arrangement of the neurones." u.here are
1 Watson, J. E. , The Eehaviorist Looks at Instincts, l.ar-oers,
July, 1927, p. 22b
Ibid.
,
p. 231
Mfoffka, Kurt, j.he Growth of the Mind, o. 91
*Ibid., p. 92
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however modifications of behavior which are cue to:
1. ihe reflex-arc is not a simple me char,ism since the
centripetal branch is connected in varying degrees of in-
timacy with numerous centrifugal "branches so that different
reactions corresponding, to different connections function
successively.
2. Certain conditions satisfy and certain ones annoy.
If a certain situation causes annoyance or failure, "other
reactions will be released by the original situation, so
that finally satisfaction is obtained."'
Variation is therefore due to annoyance or neural con-
nections, which have been previously established, ihese neural
connections are strengthened or the resistance at the synapse
weakened by the laws of frequency, recency and effect.
Koffka gives three distinctions between reflexes and
instincts
:
1. In instinctive activity the stimulus is adapted to
the situation.
2. Fine differences in the stimulus- complex may lead
to opposite reactions.
3. Aside from fatigue, the operation of a stimulus
alone is not a sufficient condition for the appearance of
the reaction.
'
Thomson ^ives several additional characteristics which
seem significant:
1. Instinctive activity is performed without previous
training.
'Koffka, Kurt, The Srowth of the Mind, pp. 9 2-5
cc
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£. j. here is a persistent tendency toward and end result
3. ihe stimulus may "be internal or external, but it
leads to actions outside the self.
4. I'fiere is an uneasiness until trie end is realized.
5. Instincts are more or less conscious.
i
6. They are modifiable to some extent.
According to Throndike's theory instincts are a series
of unrelated activities, while in reality they are continu-
ous and each activity is related to the previous one, as
well as to the end result. They might well be compared to
intelligent acts in that each of them is concerned with the
ultimate end of the activity.
Instinctive behavior might be classified ss "closed"
and "non-closed". As long as the end Instir ct s I ray Be
Close d "or Fon-
result has not been gained the organ- 01 :>sed~ .
isra is in a state of disequilibrium or transition. As sug-
gested previously, this transitional situation can well be
compared to an open triangle, which indicates with a "rela-
tively high degree of certainty the direction in which
'closure' is to be effected."*' Such behavior must have a
meaning, figure, or configuration.
It is impossible to find a physiological explanation of
such a theory otaer than that, "a connection between two dif
ferent functions is possible without the provision of a
Thomson , 1.1. K. The Springs of Hum^n Action, pp. 6b-9
3/Zoffica, Zurt, The Growth of the iviind, p. 103
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special mechanism to account for it." It is quite impos-
sible to identify any scheme of chained neurones as an ex-
planation for instinctive activity. "An explanation of
instinctive activity is therefore not called upon to dis-
cover an inherited system of connected neurones, but
rather to investigate what £ind of physico-chemical "closure"
produces these astonishing types of behavior, and under
•a.
what conditions."
Of instincts MeLougall says, "the naman mind has cer-
tain inherited tendencies which are t:ie essential springs
or motive powers of all thought and action, whether indi-
vidual or collective, and are the bases from which trie char-
acter and will of individuals end of purposive
Behs vior
nations are gradually developed under
3
the guidance of intellectual faculties.'' He further defines
instincts as, "certain innete specific tendencies of the
mind that are common to all members of any one species,
racial characters that have been slowly evolved in the pro-
cess of adaptation of species to their environment and that
can be neither eradicated from the mental constitution of
which they are innate elements, nor acquired by individuals
in the course of their lifetime." Intelligence has done
much to redirect acquired instincts. There is reason to be-
'^offxa, ICurt, The Growth of the Llind, p. 81
2Ibid.
, p. 106
JMcI)ougall, William, Social Psychology, p. 20
Ibid.
, pp. 23-4

26
lieve, "that even the most purely instinctive action is the
outcome of a distinctly mental process, involving psychical
as well as physical changes." Instinctive activity indicates
a striving towards an end, a character istic which tends to-
ward intellectual or purposive behavior. "Btery instinctive
process has the three aspects of all mental process, the
cognitive, the affective, and the conative." This persistent
striving towards an end involves the whole organism. "In
every case of behavior the energy of the whole organism seems
to be concentrated upon the task of achieving the end: all
its parts and organs are subordinated to and coordinated with
the organs primarily involved in the activity.
"
3 This theory
is very similar to that/Zoffka's, as both maintain that the
whole organism reacts to a situation.
Instincts in man are hard to determine and analyze because
they are influenced by the total behavior of the organism and
operate as a part of this total behavior. This means taat in-
stinctive actions are bidden, although it is still possible
to discover certain tendencies in behavior.
In addition to impulsive, reflex and instinctive movements
a child ma^es certain expressive movements, Expressive
Movements
such as crying, laughing and frowning. They
canr:ot be celled instinctive as they are not directed toward
any definite goal. In addition they do not serve any im-
1 McDougall
,
William, Social Psychology, p. 27
*Ibid.
,
p. b2>
'Ibid.
, pp. 361-2
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mediate purpose and cannot even be used as a means of com-
munication. They may be found to be the connecting link
between "outer" and "inner" behavior or between the emotions
and instincts.
Development takes place not by maturation alone, but
also by learning, Thorndike argues that development is only
a matter of strengthening existing bonds between sensory and
motor nerves. Since Zoffka refuses to accept a mecaanistic
explanation as the basis for human behavior he would discard
also such an explanation for learning. The child at birth
is plastic and is therefore capable of individual acquisitions.
This is a unique feature of the gestalt psychology. A child
need not be bound down by inherited tendencies or environ-
ment, but is capable of individual development, creativity.
Koffka, Zurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 117

CHAPTER III
COHSC IOU SHESS ' AHD LEAKS DUG
The highest type of activity is without doubt intel-
ligent "behavior. '.Vhether such "behavior is conscious or not
is "being widely discussed at the present time. Behaviorism
The behaviorist
,
having discarded instincts
and inborn tendencies, is now bold enough to reject also
consciousness. He takes no account of experiences since
they cannot be observed or tabulated. '..'at son says, ''there
is no observable separate entity called mind and hence thei e
can be no such thing as consciousness."' It follows that
the behaviorist need not trouble himself about a mind-bjdy
problem.
//atson aas a strenge explanation for tne "self. He
says, "all children according to our observation at iirst
think aloud. Thinking aloud disturbs society. Tae child
who does it is considered unsocial and in need oi subduing.
The subduing process ends in sub-vocalization. This robs
us of our audience, and to compensate for that we build up
a verbal fiction, a "straw man" and put him in front of us
to talk to.... The fictior of "ourselves" is equivalent to
a doll playmate, and still many of the introspect ive psy-
chologists { o on writing about the "self"/ Our behavior is
not due to the conscious foresight of the individual self,
'tfatson, J. E. , The Myth of the Unconscious, Earpers, July,
19£7, p. 503
c
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out is rather due to conditioning. Liuch an explanation
fails to take account of delayed responses and different
responses to the same stimulus. Learning consists in
forming new stimulus-response bonds and the task of the
teacher is one of conditioning or furnishing desirable stim-
uli.
'Ihorndike retains consciousness in his psychology, al-
though his stimulus-response taeory is quite Thorndike 1 s
Explanation
similar to that of '//at son. Regarding con-
sciousness he says, "man's original nature is such that,
when certain parts of his millions oi' neurones act in cer-
tain ways, he has, or is certain states of awareness, feel-
ing, consciousness, purely mental existence, or whatever one
chooses to call the inner life to which a man refers when
he a^ks uimself , "is this the same dream that I had last
night. .Vhat the exact nature of the consciousness related
to any given action of any given part of his neurones is, no
one knows. Eut no competent thinker doubts that conds exist
in original nature whereby any one iven status of man's
nervous system produces always the same conditions of con-
sciousness. ,Yaenever from any set of causes, that neurone-
status is brought to pass, tnat condition of consciousness
will also appear."'
Learning, according to ihorndike, is due to three laws,
'^.lorndike, S. L.
,
Educational Psychology, I, ihe Jriginal
i ature of Man, pp. 170-1.
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the Law of exercise, the Law of Recency arid the Law of ef-
fect. The third law is the most important, effect means
that satisfaction or dissatisfaction becomes attached to a
certain situation. "There is no other means of arousing
zeal for a given course of thought or conduct than by con-
necting satisfaction with it; the mind does not do something
for nothing."' It seems reasonable to accept the hypothesis
that we prefer to do something that brings satisfaction rather
than something that brings annoyance. By repeating this ac-
tion certain bonds are established, which become strengthened
through exercise. Before one bond can be strengthened other
bonds must be modified, ihe modifiability of a neurone
might consist in changes whereby:
1. Its form was altered.
2. Its receiving end was more or less sensitive to
forces acting on it.
3. It offered more or less resistance as a conductor.
4. It discharged in a different way.3"
ihorndike would stress interest as the prime factor in
learning. Interest tends to strengthen certain bonds and
lack of interest results in the weakening of other bonds.
Learning is determined by the character of stimulus-response
bonds present and the degree of readiness to act. A bond
tnat is not ready to act is much more easily modified tasn
one that is in a state of readiness. iuch a system of psy-
' ihorndike , J. L. educational Psychology, I, p. £95
zIbia.
,
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etiology precludes the possibility of absolutely new activ-
ity or thinking, because it is based solely on bonds already
existing. These bonds can be modified by conscious endeavor,
but the original bond cannot be completely destroyed or an
entirely new one formed.
Piilsbury gives consciousness an i ..portant place in the
learning process. He says, "consciousness does accompany
many, if not most acts wiien they are first made."' Conscious-
ness gradually decreases after the act is learned until it
finally disappears. He divides the consciousness accompany-
ing an act into three classes: Piilsbury T s
Explanation
1. ihe initiating process.
2. rxhe directing sensory process.
3. xhe awareness of results. *"
Of learning Piilsbury says, "we have seen that certain
connections are present in the organism at birth, the re-
sult of heredity and evolution of the individual and of the
species, and that learning by trial and error, controlled by
instinct, supplies the remainder."3 Ee believes, however,
that man is capable of achieving something new, «nd that
learning is not absolutely dependent upon existing connections.
"In man there seem to be cases in which there is no natural
nervous connection at the synapses, or at least in which the
instinctive connection is very weak, and in which learning takes
place through a spread of impulses over synapses very slightly
permeable .
"
'Piilsbury, V/. B.
,
Fundamentals of psychology, p. 520
*-Ibid.
,
o. 521
3Ibid.
, pp. 510-3.
¥Ibid.
,
p. 513
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"If it is proved that there is considerable variation in the
paths followed during the same function of the cortex, this fact
would prove that the formation of new connections is the rule
rather than tne exception."
Xoffka describes consciousness in terms of experiences.
From the facts of physiology we cannot affirm the presence of
consciousness, "but in spite of all this we shall refuse to ac-
cept the position of the behaviorist for the Kofffeg
'
s
Theory
simple reason that there is a consciousness,
reports of which can only be mace by the experiencing individual,
and which is therefore not subject to the control of others...
when we leave experiential observation out of account we often
reach false conclusions. "'
*"
Koffka explains intelligent behavior in terms of configura-
tions. Ke does not go so far as to say that animal behavior is
conscious although he does say, "in order to explain the ani-
mal's performance it may be necessary to assume brain-processes
suca as accompany what lor us human beings are experiences, and
by approaching the problem in this way it may be possible to
justify the assumption of consciousness in the animal." 3
It will have to be admitted we have no proof that new-born
infants are conscious. Certainly their ex- Infant vs.
periences are very limited, but a caild Uxperjen ces
born without a cortex acts very differently from a normal child
'Pillsbury, //. E. , ilie fundamentals of Psychology, p. 515
^Hoffka, Kurt, rj.ne Growth of the Mind, pp. 16-7
3Ibid .
,
p. 15
.
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from the first hour after "birth. If consciousness is not
present at birth it appears soon afterwards. It would be
fallacious to assume that infant experiences are merely im-
perfect copies of our own. If two adults do not have the
same experiences how much less can we say that a ciild has
merely an imperfect adult experience! iwo adults may attend
the same concert and listen to the same external stimuli.
One listens in ecstasy and toe other is thoroughly disgusted
and bored wit a the concert.
iaere are however a few experiences whicn may he quite
similar for adults and children. //hen an adult feels :iungry
he finds something to eat by going to a restaurant or cooking
a meal; while waen an infant is hungry he cries. It would
seem that botfc the experience of the adult and of the child
were quite similar, the only aifference being in the method
of getting food.
It would seem, too, that the equilibrium of an infant is
disturbed by an external stimulus Configuration s
'
whica breaks in on a state of rest.
If the stimulus is a ligat the infant sees not a "luminous
point, but rather a. luminous point upon an indifferent back-
ground. In the case of touch pressure is felt upon the hand,
otherwise untouched. Generally stated, from an unlimited and
ill-defined background there has arisen a limited and somewhat
definite p/ienomenon, a quality."' First experiences are
1 Koffka, ^urt, The Growth of the kind, p. 131
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qualities upon an undifferentiated background, or mental con-
figurations. A configuration may be defined as, "a co-exis-
tence of phenomena in which each member possesses its peculi-
arity only by virtue of, and in connection with all the others."
This definition of configurations assumes that experiences
from the very first are coherent, rather than a chaotic mass
of undifferentiated sensations. The behavior of a child sug-
gests that such a theory might be correct, rather than the
older theory of simple stimulus-response bonds at the root of
human behavior, and from which all experience is derived by
associati on
.
Although an infant's experiences must necessarily be
limited, still his behavior is decidedly Primitive
Conf igurg ti ons
complex even from the very beginning. It
seems that a child reacts to a complex stimulus or situation
before it reacts to a more simple one. ^or example, an in-
fant will react to its mother's face, as early as the second
month, and in the sixth month will act quite differently to-
ward a friendly face than to an angry one.*" It would seem
therefore that such phenomena as "friendly" and "unfriendly"
are more pri dtive than the separate parts of the human face
or even a color configuration. A two year old cnild can easily
recognize his mother's picture, but is unable to recognize
pictures of eyes, ears, noses, etc. Ihis does not seem so re-
markable when we consider the fact that "friendliness and
'Zoff ka
,
Kurt, rihe Growth of the Mind, pp. 131-E
rbid
. ,
p. 134
.
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unfriendliness certainly influence "behavior, whereas it is
not so ea&y to understand how the behavior of so primitive
an organism as the human infant could be motivated by the
picture of an ear."' The human voice, which is very compli-
cated, is among the first sound situations to which a child
reacts. If this theory is true, and it seems at least
specious, it would be a rather difficult task for a cross
mother to scold a cross baby, end expect to improve t.ie
baby's disposition thereby
It would seem that the .cost primitive phenomena are not
a mosaic of sensations, but rather a con- Experiment
.iTh
"
Hens
figuration arising from an undifferent-
iated background. It cannot be proved that simple configu-
rations ere necessarily the first to appear. Xohler proved
the truth of this statement in his experiment with hens.
He allowed the uens to eat corn from a light grey piece of
paper, which was placed near a dark grey piece of paper. The
darker paper also had corn on it, but the hens were not al-
lowed to eat from it. The position- of both papers was changed
frequently to prevent the hens from learning to eat the corn
on the brighter piece because of its position. When the hens
had learned to eat the corn from the bright piece of paper, a
still brighter piece of paper was introcuced to take the place
of the dark paper, The new paper was neutral, and according
to the sensation theory the hens would not eat from it. In
'Xoffka, xlurt , The Growth of the Mind, p. 155
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the critical test it was found thst the hens ciose the neutral
paper almost three times as often as the positive paper.
This would imply that the hens retained a dark-bright pat-
tern rather than two distinct color sensations. A similar
experiment was carried on with a three year old child, wit a
the result that the cnild chose the neutral color in prefer-
ence to the positive one. /in adult would undoubtedly choose
the positive color because of a more highly developed "abso-
lute factor".' By "absolute factor" is meant the ability to
remember distinct qualities rather than configurations.
There must be some kind of a connection between "inner"
and "outer" behavior. If a person's " Inner " and
"Outer " Be-
equilibrium is disturbed by an ex- havior
ternal situation, there must be some explanation for this
phenomenon. ^oifka woula explain this connection in terms
of configurations, which arise from a. background of "other-
ness". A quality emerges from a uniform background to which
the organism as a whole responds. Infant configurations
lack the complexity and definiteness of adult configurations.
There are four different ways by which we develop men-
tally. As stated earlier, mental de- Llental
Development
velopment parallels physical development
at least during the early years of a child's life.
The first type of mental development is a purely motor
' Iloffka, Aurt , The Growth of the 'ind, p. 141
(Hi
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phenomenon, 'ihe earliest movements seem to "be random move-
ments, and yet they probably serve to coordinate the muscles
of the body. Motor learning consists in Ilotor
Learning
developing innate movements and achieving
new ones.
an example of motor learning is walking. Whether a
child actually learns to walk, or whether walking is depen-
dent upon maturation is a much disputed question. Certainly
a child walks very awkwardly at first, and after a few weeks
there is a marked improvement. Iloffka believes that walking
is an inherited type of behavior, which can be improved with
practice
.
An even more primitive type of motor learning is grasp-
ing. j.he sole purpose of grasping objects is to put them into
hia mouth. Until a child is two years old, everything that
comes within his reach is put into his mouth. 1,'ore compli-
cated examples of motor learning are writing, playing basket
hall and learning to write rapidly on B typewriter.
"She more strictly motor a task is, the less has con-
sciousness to do with learning, and the more must the learner
be directed upon the result, rather than upon the activity it-
sell.' 1 Consciously attending to a purely motor ta^k usually
leads to confusion. .->.fter having driven a car practically
every day for some six years I attempted to teach another
'Xoffka, iZurt, The Growth of the Kind, p. 250
[I
3b.
person to drive it. I found that when I tried to remember
and describe how to shift gears I was utterly confused,
j. yping has also become for me a mechanical task. Looking
at the typewriter when I -am typing is sure to result in con-
fusion and mistakes.
Spifflea advances the theory that motor learning is due
to the unification of a "movement- "Movement -
Malodie"a*n
melody". Ihis movement-melody de-
velops only when the attention is directed upon the goal
and not upon the activity necessary to reach that goal. It
is only another name for configurations. If the gestalt
taeory of psychology is to be accepted for motor learning
we must accept their hypothesis that such learning is due
to the formation ox c onf igurations. 'Ihis means that learn-
ing is a whole process and not a series of disconnected pro-
cesses patched together. Whether motor learning is maturation
or achievement matters little as they both lead to the same
end, new configurations.
'Ihe second direction of mental growth is sensory.
Psychologists usually classify the senses under five aeads--
visual, auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory. Pills-
bury adds the kinaesthetic sensations, whereby we appreciate
the movements of our own bodies; the sense of equilibrium
t
and the organic sensations such as hunger and thirst. Prac-
tically all of our knowledge comes through the senses, and
(II
39.
the task of perfecting them is obviously a difficult one.
Instead of the child seeing at first a Sensory
learning
chaotic mass of meaningless objects, he
probably sees only a uniform background from which gradual-
ly configurations arise.
There is little doubt but what we gain more knowledge
through our eyes than through any other sense organ. Very
early a child turns toward a bright object and notices the
difference between night er.d day. A brigat object does tend
to stand out much more clearly than a dull one. It would be
erroneous to assume that an infant can differentiate between
a red piece of paper and a blue one. He does however tend to
reach for the one that stands out most clearly from the back-
ground. In other words, the first configuration is color as
opposed to non-color. "After the stage of color--non-color
,
there follows a period in which 'warm--cold' and probably also
'warm— colorless' end 'cold— colorless' configurations arise.,
then a differentiation tajces place within the 'warm 1 2nd 'cold'
colors, causing the four principal colors, red, yellow, green
and blue to appear. Color cor figurations are constituted in
four directions."' Later still more color configurations are
added until an individual can differentiate a large number
of colors.
At first the field of vision is very limited, because
the child sees only what is directly in Vi si on
'iloffka, xlurt, Ihe Growth of the kind, pp. 274-5
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front of him, and also because he is nearsighted. Grad-
ually the field of vision is enlarged. ",Ve must think of
development in terms of a process of maturation in the course
of which certain regions of the nervous system attain the
capacity of forming fixed configurations which at first they
do not possess; this process of maturation being dependent upon
functional employment."' The first objects that are recognized
are not necessarily the simplest, "but are those which are
intimately connected with the life of the child. They prob-
ably do not arouse much "inner" reaction, as the internal
structure develops with practice.
A further peculiarity of infantile perception is, "to
a child form is much more independent of its absolute spa-
tial position than it is to us adults. " *" Children often
look at books upside down or -rite words in all sorts of
positions. If s child can see a picture just as easily
when it is upside down as right side up, it seems reasonable
to believe that he sees many otner things ver,; differently
from the way adults see them.
A child probably associates effect wita an object be-
fore substance. His interest is in what an object can do,
not what it is. As more and more configurations appear they
become related. She growth of sensations may be stated as:
'iloffka, Hurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 2u5
*Ibia.
,
p. 293
II
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"the primitive, dib jointed phenomenal patterns of infancy
must "be replaced by an integrated, merabered snd effectively
composed outlook upon The world."'
The taird type of mental growth is sensori-motor . ?ew
activities can tie said to "be purely Sensori-motor
Learning
sensory or purely motor. "The re-
lation of motor to sensory lecrning is indicated "by the fact
that many of the laws of sensory learning have been found
applicable to motor adaptations, and nence it cannot be
supposed that motor and sensory learning are derived from
tvso different sources, 'ihe improvement in a performance
ought therefore to consist in the construction of better
and more complete configurations." "The problem of be-
havior is to carry out appropriate actions which involve
the motorium in situations that are mediated to the indi-
vidual through his sensorium."' If behavior is to be con-
sidered the reaction of a whole organism to a situation there
can be no purely motor or purely sensory acquisitions.
Zoffka illustrates sensori-motor learning by the maxim
that "a burnt child shuns the fire". A cuild will at first
reach for the fire with delight. After he has oeen burned
by the fire he will slap it instead of reaching for it, pro-
viding he was paying attention to the fire at the time he
was burned. If he was burned while he was paying attention
'Aoffka, Zurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 145
AIbid.
,
p. Eol
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to something else the child has probably not learned to shun
the fire. If he was paying- attention, the result is that the
same stimulus nas produced two contradictory responses. mihe
change of response to a constant stimulus does not take place
by alternation in the function of ready-made devices, but is
a result of a change in the perceptive process produced by
the stimulus."' ihere nas been a change in the perceptive
process, whereby a new meaning has been attached to the stim-
ulus, fire. If meaning has been attached to the stimulus the
response cannot be a purely motor one, but must include also
conscious attention.
The first important learning a child does is imitate the
actions of other people. At first he Imitation
imitates indiscriminately, and for this reason it is of sup-
reme importance that hi come in contact with desirable ac-
tivities, as a child grows older he ought to become more
discriminating in the things he imitates. He will perhaps
seek an authority and ia.itate the principles advocated by that
authority. ...acCunn says, "the value of imitation lies not in
the precise manner of action, but in the spirit in which the
action is done. Literal imitation is childish." 3" We should
^ encourage a child to act, not as a certain individual acted,
but rather as he might have acted, had he lived at the present
time and encountered present-day problems. Unfortunately, or
'Koffka, Kurt, Mental development, Psychologies of 1925, p. 136
LlacCunn, J, The Making of Character, p. 163
CI
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perhaps fortunately, most of us are still back in the earlier
stages of imitation, and it is only the genius who rises
above this level.
Zoffka gives two principles of imitation. First, imi-
tation involves "configurations already "belonging to an in-
dividual's equipment, which are made to function "by the per-
formance of an act jf the same kind on the part of another
individual."' inis type of imitation may be instinctive or
acquired. second, "imitation may also be the arousal of a
new configuration in an individual when he perceives someone
else acting in a certain manner." This second type is un-
doubtedly aigher than the first because it. leads to the
achievement of new problems. It is probably less complete
t.ian the model copied. "Imitation may either be of a move-
ment or of a series of movements, or it may be of a purposive
action." 3 The difference between lower ind higher forms of
imitation is in degree only. .Vhen we imitate ever; so simple
an action as yawning, we imitate the act as a whole and not
the separate movements made in yawning. A cnild often imi-
tates his own actions. He will, for example, repeat the same
words over and over again for the reason that, "a configura-
tion once given provides favorable conditions for the arousal
of the same or of a si ailar configuration."
'iloffka, K«rt f The Growth of the Hind, p. 307
*Ibid,
, p. 308
*Ibid.
, p. 310
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io explain imitation, especially the lower forms, we
must assume that there is some connection "between percep-
tion and movement or "between the sensory and motor nerves.
A stimulus tends to upset the state of equilibrium in the
individual, and this state continues until the individual
has convinced himself that he has made a good copy of the
model
.
Imitation is extremely important as there are many
things we could not learn without it. It would be impos-
sible to learn to talk, sing or write without a model. A
good part of our learning consists in understanding models
given "by other people, ihese models may "be in the form of
actual pictures or objects, or tney may be in the form of
language. Seldom do even adults actually invent new ideas
or models.
The fourth type of mental development is ideational
learning. It is characterized by Id eational
learning
delayed responses to certain situa-
tions. In the three earlier types of development the re-
sponse usually follows immediately after the stimulus. This
fourta type of mental development largely differentiates
human beings from animals.
Language is our most important medium of thought. ,'ith
it wi can recall the oast and antici- Language
pate the future. It is through written and spoken language
that orach of our learning is done. A child, who is learn-
(
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ing to talk, will use one word to express a whole sentence,
between the ages of two and three a child is an eternal
question "box. At first he is interested in knowing the
names of every object, although he does not attempt to re-
peat them. Often there is an interval of several months
between the time when the name of an object is asked and the
actual use of the name, Thia would indicate that child
has the configuration of an object long before he actually
uses its name. Certainly a child knows what z spoon is long-
before he says, "spoon".
"It is also a feature of the thing-concept that its
configuration should nave a core, or center, to which the
members of a configuration adhere in a definite manner; in
other words, a thing has its attributes. It has often been
remarked that nothing remains of a thing when its attributes
are removed... in the categories of things there is a peculiar
kind of cohesion which counts most; and this can be des-
cribed psychologically in no other way than by stating that
these variable attributes adaere to a stable core ... Certain-
ly the core is more original than the sum of its attributes
.
therefore the thing does not originate in 'non-thingness
'
,
but rather replaces 'non-t.iingness ' • "
'
Through the use of language a chile is able to combine
two or more configurations, this in- Combination of
TTonTigurat ions
volves the broadening of vocabulary
'Zoffka, ^:urt, the Growth of the :.:ind, pp. 322-3
I
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from a one word sentence to a many-word sentence, The
combining' of event- configurations leads to the establish-
ment of causal relations between them. Causal relations
are largely responsible for delayed reactions. An indi-
vidual will consider possible responses to a certain situa-
tion only after he has learned that there is a relation
between situation, response and after-effect. If a child
has been punished for stealing money from nis mother's purse
to buy candy, he has found that there is a relation between
the pleasure of taking money, buying candy end eating it,
and the pain of punishment afterwards. His mental atti-
tude has been largely changed, even as the burnt child's
attitude has been changed toward the fire.
The establishment of relation configurations must in-
clude the establishment of mental attitudes. Mental
Attitudes
An apparent difficulty with mental atti-
tudes, established under such conditions, is the fact that
they are apt to be established as the result of a pragmatic
test, which was successful or unsuccessful. An ideal men-
tal attitude is one which is based on experience plus know-
ledge. This fourth type of mental cevelopment makes it pos-
sible for an individual to acquire knowledge end apply it.

CHAPTEB IV
Q05SBBTATI01? OF VALU^5 ACHIEVED BY
LEARNING
Learning is valuable only insofar as what is learned is
remembered. .Vere it not for the fact that we can recall and
recognize objects it would be useless to learn them in the
first place. Recognition is even more important than recall
because it is through recognition that we remember exper-
iences as our own.
An action is usually easier to perform the second time
than the first, and with each succeeding trial
Memory
it becomes proportionately easier, memory
enables us to retain performances even after a single
trial. If part of our actions are purely instinctive they
should be more or less perfected at birth. nowever, even
instinctive activities improve with practice. ^uch im-
provement, according to the older theory of learning, is
due to maturation end exercise. Iloffiia maintains that all
#
improvement is due to learning. In hi 5 uer types of be-
havior improvement is even more marked with each secces-
sive trail.
Learning involves not only memory, but also the problem
of how the first performance was accomplished. xhese first
performances .loffka calls achievement, achi evement
and he further states tn«?.t
t "all learning is non-heritable
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achievement
.
iais empirical view is very different from
the nativistic theory advanced "by i horndike, which bold!
that all activity is due to the maturation and recombina-
tion of an inherited mechanism.
Thorndike accounts for memory and aabit by the theory
termined bonds existing "between
that, "among the numerous prede-
^
horn kike "s
the ories for
kemo ry and "habit
any situation and the many possible reactions to it, a few
are retained and strengthened, while tae rest are eliminated."
"Whatever does favor the repetition and satisfyingness of
the desirable bonds, and the disuse and annoyingness of un-
desirable bonds, will, other things "being equal, favor im-
provement .
"
3 Bonds are strengthened or weakened according to
tae laws of exercise, recency and effect. Buhler says,
"succeso brings pleasure and pleasure determines the fre-
quent repetition of any movement that was once successful,
while frequent repetition gives it a fixed and enduring char-
acter, failure, on the other hand, brings displeasure, which
does not promot repetition, ihus unsuccessful movements are
not retained, but eliminated."
ouch an hypothesis necessitates tae repetition of iden-
tical movements made in previous successful trials. In ac-
tual experiments this hypothesis breaks down, as animals do
'Koffka, „urt , ihe Growth of the Mind, p. 152
AThorndike, IT., Animal Intelligence, Experimental Studies, p. 108
thorndike, .v., Educational Psychology, II, p. 214
,J
Buhler, K. , Die geisti t;e ^ntwicklung des kinues, p. 132

not as a rule repeat the identical movements mede in pre-
vious successful trials, but only the same general kind ef
movements. lloffke interprets Thorndike's theory as meaning,
"animals never participate in whet they are doing, and
never know that a criticsl action will bring them freedom
snd food. .. animals are altogether blind in their learning."'
inorndike, on the. other hand, says, "the lower animals do
occasionally show signs of ideas and of their influence on
benavior, but the great bulk of their learning has been
found explainable by such direct binding of acts to situa-
tions, unmediated by ideas." 1 "At least nine- tenths of animal
and human learning is accomplished by the principle of mul-
tiple response, i. e. certain responses are strengthened;
resulting in the weakening of other bonds." 5
"
Intelligent behavior must involve insight as to the end
desired. ouch learning would necessarily be slow at firt,
allowing for the individual to grasp Insight
the problem. J^fter the problem is understood the learning
curve should show a sudden drop with no recurrent rise. It
seems reasonable to accept insight as a criterion for intel-
ligent behavior, as it assumes that memory is a determining
factor in learning. A knowledge of the end and general pro-
cedure necessary to attain that end would lead a person to
the conclusion that intelligence was responsible for trie act.
'Loffka, xlurt, The Growth of the Mind, pp. 160-6
"ihorndike, If., Educational Psychology, II, p. 11
Ibid.
,
p. 12.
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Most psychologists today maintain that animal behavior
is not intelligent. They cite examples or recurrent rises
in the learning curve due to stupid errors. Animal
IntelTigence
These stupid errors are probably due to
the fact tnet the animal has not properly understood the
problem. Stupid errors are not confined to animal behavior;
human beings often make them. In attempting to put together
a mechanical puzzle a person may repeatedly make the same
error, even though he knows that it will not lead to a
proper solution of the problem. Even Stupid
Errors
after the correct solution has been
worked out, the person may make a number of stupid errors be-
fore he agsin worics the problem successfully. If human be-
ings repeatedly make stupid errors it would be false to say
that they possess insight and animals are lacking in it. In
addition there are many instances in ariims 1 behavior where
t.ie learning curve falls sudd nly aud does not rise again.
..e may assume that stupid errors in animal behavior are
due to an improper understanding of the problem or an in-
ability to reconstruct the new situation in terms of previous
conf igurati ons.
A. second criterion for intelligent behavior is the abil-
ity to transfer knowledge from one situa- rj.ransi'er of
lino »1 edge
tion to another similar one. There is
evidence of frequent transfers of actions, in animal behavior,
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from one situation to another. This would lead to the
hypothesis that animals can reconstruct, to a certain ex-
tent at least, a previous situation.
another important feature is the fact that, "tae ani-
mal usually alters its "behavior alterations in
Be havior
to correspond exactly with the
most important feature of t.ie situation." 1 If a dog learned
to release itself from a cage by pulling a lever with its
teeth, and tnen the method of escape from the cage was
changed to pulling a loop on the opposite side of the ca,-:e,
the dog would continue to bite at the place where the lever
was in the previous problem, ouch behavior excludes the
theory that animal behavior is meaningless, The important
characteristics in the situation become transitional char-
acteristics toward the forming of a new configuration. If
this second criterion of intelligent behavior is c determin-
ing factor in animal learning, it would lend added proof to
the theory that sil learning is accomplished by configura-
tions.
To discover whether behavior is due to maturation or
learning it is necessary to elimi- I/Iaturat ion vs
L earlrTTng
nate all caance discoveries and re-
actions. If behavior is due to maturation there can be no
entirely new reactions. If, on the other hand, behavior is
'Xoffka, Kurt, Ihe Growtn of the Liind, p. 171
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due to learning the hypothesis must "be accepted that we
can do something entirely new. ouch experiments cannot
easily he carried on with edults as they have too rpany
ready-made reactions, which need only to he transferred to
the new situation. What we are looking for is the develop-
ment of the simplest and most original devices. such a
study could hest he carried on with children or animals,
whose "behavior appreaches that of human "beings.
Wolfgang Zohler spent a considerable length of time ob-
serving and experimenting with anthropoid apes. Zohler 1 a
Experiments
He attempted to disprove the theory that all
animal learning is meaningless, by pro\-ing that chimpanzees
do show insight in their learning. The experiments Kohler
carried out were planned to provide a situation in which the
direct goal was hidden, hut an indirect way left open. Ke
attempted to make every situation fully compreaensihle
,
thus excluding as far as possible the necessity for chance
discoveries. An attempt was made also to make each experiment
a little more difficult than the previous one.
It was noted that in practically every instance the
chimpanzee did not wander around aimlessly before attempting
to solve the problem. Instead it seemed to deliberate a few
minutes, suddenly give a start, and then proceed with a single
'Koffha, Xurt , ihe Growth of the Kind, p. 161
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impulse in 9 new direction to the attainment of the goal.
Similar "behavior is often to be noted in children. They too
stop to deliberate a^d when 9 possible solution comes to
their minds their faces light up and they proceed at once to
try out the new solution.
llb'hler performed a number of experiments with chimpanzees
in an attempt to prove that animal behavior is often such that
insight must be present. I shall not attempt to "sketch all
his experiments, as a few will be sufficient to prove his
point. In one experiment a chimpanzee watched Ilohler bury a
"basket of fruit. The chimpanzee immediately found the hole
and dug up the fruit. To make the experiment more difficult
Ilohler let the chimpanzee watch him dig a number of holes, in
one of which the fruit we s buried. Several days elapsed "before
the cnimpanzee was allowed to leave the cage. As soon as it
was free it went immediately to the right hole and found the
fruit. Such behavior could not be the result of mere chance.
another experiment with chimpanzees consis-ted in placing
some fruit outside the cage beyond the reach of the chim-
panzees, a string was tied to the fruit and the end of the
string placed within ess^ reaching distance. This experi-
ment was carried out successfully and without hesitation by
ail the chimpanzees. It was altered "by placing a number of
strings outside the cage, onl, one of which was attached to
the fruit. It was found that the chimpanzees invariably chose
the shortest string first. The fruit was drawn toward the
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animal in a direct fashion and not accidentally . "It was
observed that the string was always drawn quite literally with
regard to the goal. Glancing toward the goal, the animal
would begin to draw the string; the animal's behavior be-
ing always directed upon the goal rather than upon the string."
A similar experiment was tried on dogs, but it was found
that they were not capable of accomplishing the task.
She experiment was made more difficult by placing the
fruit beyond the reach of the chimpanzees and placing a stick
inside the cage. "It was observed that from the very start
the animal would place the stick correctly behind the goal
in order to fetch the fruit forward."' In some instances the
chimpanzees were not able successfully to conclude this ex-
periment because the stick was placed too far away from the
goal* Sometimes the chimpanzee looked at the stick and still
failed to use it because it could not see both the stick and
the goal at the same time. _2offka explains this by saying,
"it is not merely a matter of seeing or noticing an object
such as a stick, because before it is employed the object
must cease to be an isolated neutral thin;, to the animal and
become a member of tne situation at hand. The object must
become a tool, as a necessary condition for a correct type
of behavior an alteration must occur in the object of percep-
tion... The act of employing a stick seems to involve a
transformation in the situation confronting the animal; for
'i£offka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 169
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the stick, which at first was a matter of indifference to
the animal, now becomes definitely releted to the situa-
tion. What the animal has actually learned is to make an
irrelevant object relevant to the situation. "' The ir-
relevant object becomes a tool or has acquired a functional
value. "A transfer of learning from one thing to another
results, therefore, from the sensible application of a
a.
certain principle of configuration." Attention alone can
not account for tnis transfer as mere focusing of attention
on a stick could not endow it wit a the property of being
a "tool".
In still another experiment the difficulty of attain-
ing the goal was increased by placing the fruit above the
animal's reach and placing a box inside the cage. To reach
the fruit it was necessary for the chimpanzee to push the
box unaer the fruit and then climb on the box. Ihis proved
a difficult experiment and the chimpanzee would usually end
by destroying the box. Children who are unsuccessful in
performing a certain activity often become discouraged and
attempt to destroy whatever comes within their reach, es-
pecially tnings pertaining to the situation. One chimpanze
was u .able to solve this problem as long afl anjther chim-
panzee was lying jn the box. '.Vhen the other ape jumped off
of the box the first one immediately carried the box &nd
placed it directly ui.cier the fruit* It would seem that as
iloffka, xjurt, The Growth of the ...ind, pp. 191-2
Ibid.
, p. 193
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long as the other ape was lying on the box it was not "an
object frith which to fetch the goal, but something upon
which to lie."' Had the box been regarded as an object
with which to fetch the goal as long as the first chimpan-
zee was lying on it, it would tare necessitated the chang-
ing of an object from one configuration to another. It is
always hard to break: up a definite configuration which al-
ready exists. "
*
An even more interesting experiment was tried on Sultan,
the cleverest of the chimpanzees. Two sticks were placed
inside the cage, each of which was tjo short to reach the
goal, but one stick: could be fitted inside the second one.
oultan tried for a long time to solve the problem. Among
other things he pushed one stick ss far as it would go and
then took the second stick and carefully pushed the first
stick until it actually touched the fruit. Later he ac-
cidentally hold one stick in each hand in such a way that
thej came into line with one another. He immediately placed
the smaller one inside the larger and was able to draw the
fruit in with the stick. The solution depended upon
chance, "but it was not c:iance that led to the goal, nor did
chance provide a pricticable t ool ... although a "fortunate
variation" assisted in the solution, the solution itself is
in no wise to be counted as having been one of ca^nee.
"
1
'iloffka, iCurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 196
^Ibid. , o. 19 7
'Ibid.
,
p. 199
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Prom this brief discription of the behavior of apes
it must be admitted that they actually solved new problems,
whicn. could not have been de- achievement
of Apes
pendent upon previous neural con-
nections. "The essential thing about these solutions is
not a new combination of movements with which the animals
were already familiar, but a new configuration of the
whole field."
It was observed that in the intervals between the pre-
sentation of the problem and the ultimate solution most of
the time was occupied in doing irrelevant things or else in
rest. Often the chimpanzee would stop and appear to be con-
sidering the situation, and when a solution did "dawn" it
would be carried out without a break. "Instead of tie solu-
tion first arising by chance, and thereafter becoming more
or less understood, understanding or an appropriate trans-
formation of the field precedes the objective solution ." ^ A
configuration of the total process must proceed the solu-
tion of the problem. "An intelligent construction of the
field takes place with respect to the goal, and the solution
is nothing else than the arousal of this construction." 3
ouch a theory necessitates the discarding of the old
association theory. It means that we must accept the fact
that absolutely new activities can be learned* "The sudden
'iioffka, xCurt, ihe Growth of the Mind, u. £02-3
"Ibid
. ,
p. 205
Ibid .
,
p. £09
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graspine of the solution whieh results is a process that
runs its course in accordance with the nature of the situ-
ation, so that the complete solution of the problem takes
piece with reference to the configuration of the field of
perception.
"
Ruger performed a number of experiments with people
in en attempt to discover how human laiger '
s
ixp cfTments
"beings react in similar situations.
Ihe problem was to solve three dimensional mechanical puz-
zles, which could not be fully understood by the subject.
It was noted that there were many random movements and
stupid errors. Many movements whica led to no change in
the situation were repeated time after time. "If a suc-
cessful movement came about by chance, the first consequence
as a rule was that the region in which the work was being
done, or the particular kind of movement was empas sized and
became the focus of the whole procedure ." ^ Often movements
which led to success were made unintentionally and their
significance was not recognizee. "If we ask what then con-
stitutes learning in these experiments, the answer is that
in addition to mere perfection of manual dexterity learning
consists essentially in an organization of the whole procedur
'Xoffka
,
Hurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. 214
*Tbia.
,
p. 177
'Ibid.
,
c. 176
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Buhler advanced the theory that there are three stages
of development— instinctive
,
training and intelligence. In-
stinctive and habitual beaavior take place by virtue of con-
nections "between definite pathways in th central organs of
the nervous system. In instinctive activity these bonds
are fixed, while in aabitual behavior they are modifiable.
Instincts are merely the acquired nabits of one's ancestors,
.loffka explains instinctive, habitual and intelligent be-
xiavior in ttrms of configurations. "iae principle of con-
figuration, which has proved its validity in explaining acts
of intelligence, is simcly transferred to the explanetion
of lower forms of beaavior."
aabituation requires a long time because, "the condi-
tions of external surroundings, or of the Habits
internal organization of the animal, ex-
clude the possibility of immediately apprehending the con-
figurations. .. Instead of serving to strengthen bonds, the
chief function of repetion is to prepare the ground for tae
construction of an appropriate figure which first occurs as
a result of chance. After the configuration has once been
constructed, repetition serves to make tae behavior appre-
ciably firmer and easierrrbut not bef ore ." c Unless a con-
figuration is established repetition is ineffective. Ihe
function of repetition is to form configurations rather than
Zoffka, ihirt, Ihe Growth of the I.dind, p. £21
-'Ibid.
,
p.
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to strengthen existing "bonds. Instead of attempting to
explain instinctive, habitual and intelligent behavior in
terms of three principle configurations it is better to
explain them as three phases of the same principle.
Learning must be dependent upon memory. .'.'ere it not
for memory there would be no con- e mo ry- images
servation of the values of achievement, memory serves as
the connecting link between the past, pr#aent and futuy*.
.»e see a flash of lightning and through past experiences
we are led to expect a crash of thunder to follow it. Thus
memory-images enable us to have our minds "set" for the
future.
Contrasted to "memory-images" is another type of mem-
ory--perception. Ihrough percep- Perceptual
1. emory
tual memory we are able to recog-
nisse a .vide variety of objects and classify them.
"I'he achievements of memory are threefold:
1. rihe participation of conscious- Achievements
of Memory
ness which may be more or less definite.
2. ihe relation of tnis consciousness to perception
'6, Certain kinds and degrees of positional and temporal
definition, which may be altogether perceptual ." *~
The first step in memory is one of familiarity or lack
of familiarity. A child reacts favor- familiarity
' Jioffka, Kurt, xhe Growth of the Mind, pp. 236-7
^Ibid., p. £41
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ably to a familiar person and is afraid of a stranger. The
reason for this is that the "background of conscioi;.sness ac-
quired the peculiar character of a relatively fixed level
upon which separate phenomena make their appearance. .'. ston-
ishment follows when this level is altered." The second step
in memory is expectation. A child Expectation
hears his mother's voice, when she is in another room, and
turns his head expecting to see her face.
..arely does a child remember anything that happened be-
fore he was two years old, and then such images are very
vague and often inaccurate. Only very unusual events are re-
membered or events that make a strong impression on the child.
I doubt if many adults can remember as * Memory g oan
many as a dozen connected experiences that nappened before
their six£h year. A child can occasionally remember what
happened yesterday, but it is almost impossible to remember
that a certain thing occurred the day before yesterday, They
connect events with places rather than with time. Adults usual
also connect events with places rather trian with definite
periods of time.
"Recognition is a more primitive type of behavior than re-
membrance, x^urthermore
,
it has been shown Recogni
t
ion
that ta. motives for remembrance undergo development; for at
first remembrance attaches to perception, and only later to
'lloffka, Hurt, The Growth of the ::ir:d, p. 242
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images. In the "beginning the child is passive with respect
to his remembrances, but gradually he learns to control
them so that voluntarily, or upon being questioned, he can
recall to mind definite events.'1 A person csn have no con-
trol over what another person remembers. The best teacher in
the world cannot guarantee what every child in her room will
remember. "It is said that we remember two-tent.is of what we
hear and five-tenths of what we see. /.aether or not such a
proportion is a tiue estimate, it cannot be denied that what
is seen is retained longer than what is heard, end that general-
ly a deeper impression is made thereby, not alone in relation
to memory, but also in the effect on feelings and will. a One
thing is very certain and that is, we cannot choose for a child
jjnst which two-tenths of what he hears or whieh five-tenths of
what iie sees he will remember.
Koffka gives two laws of learning. oince he discards
the old theory of neural connections he must also discard the
laws of association. In its place he gives the following law:
"It the phenomena A, B, and C... Laws of Learning
have been present once or oftener
as members of a configuration, and if one of these reappears
while still possessed of its "membership-character", it will
have a tendency to supplement itself more or less definitely
and completely with the remainder of the total configuration.
"
J
'Koffka, Kurt, The Growth of the Mind, p. £44
^Beard, Frederica, Pictures in Religious Education, p. 33
Hoffice, Kurt, The growth of the Mind, p. 246
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the old law of association involved also reproduction by
similarity in terms of neural connections, aid hence there
was an effort made to discard the theory entirely and ex-
plain everything in terms of "bonds" of association, ihia
led to even more trouble and confusion. Kofflts explains
the second lav; of similarity by saying that, "configurations
once presei.t will furnish conditions fororable to the ap-
pearance of others like or similar to them."'
xhe laws of learning may be stated briefly as follows:
"widen a new c jnf iguration arises under fixed objective con-
ditions, this behavior of ta c organism it somehow preserved.
i.pon repeating the objective conditions, the configuration
will accordingly arise much easier and much swifter than it
did the first time. It will also return ;vhen the external
conditions change and ere no longer so favorable as they
were at first, even thouga the conditions are so incomplete
that they would of themselves give rise only to a part of
the whole configuration."
In the next chapter I shall attempt to show that what
is remembered of the configurations that are formed is due
to a large extent to the mental attitude of the individual
toward certain situations.
'iloffka, ilurt, fhe Growth of the l.ind, p. 24e
Ibid.
, pp. 24o-9

Oa^PTi^H V
PRODUCTS Of xhA LEARKIEG PHOC3SS
Children are torn slaves to adults. At every turn a
child meets compulsion and opposition from adults. ?ew
adults credit children with the ability to make choices or
discover anything for themselves. It is not surprising tnat
a favorite game with children is playing that they are men
and women. Ihe average child wants more than anything else
to grow up so he can do the tilings which he is not allowed
to do; taings which perhaps he sees his older "brothers and
sisters doing.
A child lives in a separate world from that of an adult.
The _atter world often seems very harsh and unjust to a child.
The child' a world is one of play, hut he The Child '
s
7 or id
takes his play seriously. A.f long as he is
in his own world he' will really work at his play, often car-
rying out unaided very difficult projects. Two hoys that
I knew spent all of their time for a month making an ice
"boat similar to a picture of one they saw in a magazine.
•:.hen the host was finished the boys found that it was much
too tig and heavy to carry, and in addition the thought came
to t;iem for the first time tiiat there was no lake within
walking distance, wnere the;/ could sail their boat. Ead
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these same two boys been asked to spend an equal amount
of energy sawing wood end making apple boxes I am sure
they would have felt very much abused. from the physical
point of view their play was strenuous work, and yet they
resented interruptions on the part of an adult who asked
them to stop for arjy reason.
Often I have heard children grumble, Hyou never will
let me do anything I want to do." The chances are that
this same child has gone to his mother at least ten times
during the day with the day with the question, !,what can
I do?" As long as the mother suggests something which the
child regards as play, the child is satisfied, but the
minute there is- a suggestion of something which he regards
as work, trouble begins.
_"aviland says, "play is nature's way of developing the
child physically, mentally snd morally. .. Value in
."lay
Constructive play fulfils innate desires
for action snd invention and gives ability for work with
mind 2nd hands... The child grows through his own self-ex-
pression and not through the achievement of parents or
teachers. .. There is nothing that in itself is either work
or play, but thinking makea it so. Wholesome work is merely
the extension of play."' However, a child should not be
given the mi simpression that everything is easy, but that
'haviland. Marry 3. , Character Training in Childhood, pp. 166-179
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work can "be pleasant and as interesting as his play, oome
i^ieces of work should arouse his fighting instinct "because
of their very difficulty. Whether Work vs. Play
the project is work or play depends
upon the mental attitude of the child. A four year old
child will "beg to "be allowed to wipe the di^nes, wnile the
same child will grumble w.ien asked to do tie same task
three years later, i'he difference between these two modes
of behavior lies not in the situation, which is the same
in "both instances, but rather in the mental attitude which
has developed in the child's mind. In the first instance
wiping the dishes was play, while in the second it iad en-
tered the realm of work, and had therefore become distaste-
ful, inasmuch as work is a part of the adult's world.
A second characteristic of trie childs' world is the
fact that there is no discrimination made between animate
and inanimate objects. For All objects ant imate
aim e sticA is as truly alive ss his dog. His problem is mt
to breat.ie life into inanimate ol jects, but rather to learn
the distinction betweer. things which are deed and things
which are alive. He learns gradually that "tiere are con-
tradictions in living things; he must approach them and
shape his reactions to them quite differently than with in-
ert things* I'he learning of this distinction may be made
more difficult by the fact t v: t living things conform more
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than inert things to the wishes of the child; thus display-
ing, in a certain sense, an opposin6 "behavior."' In addi-
tion he learns to relate the consequences to the stimulus
and response. He finds that much more unpleasant conse-
quences result from abusing animate things than inanimate
ones.
kXl psychologists would agree that successful activity
"brings pleasure. ihey would how- Pleasure a Result
of juccessful kc -
ever, disagree on the method "by tivity
which pleasure is affixed to a certain action and dis-
pleasure to others. James would insist that pleasure tends
to fix certain donds, while KofXka would argue that pleasure
was due to the succecsful formation of certain configurations,
oince this paper is concerned with Kofffca'e interpretation
of mental attitudes, I shall fur the present disregard James's
theory
.
I heard one mother say sometime ago, "children are "born
naturally bad and whatever good, traits the$ acquire must "be
spanked into them." In this case goodness is forced on a
child from the outside. In contrast to this theory is Bright-
man's who says, "every child is a potential citizen of
heaven, but without training every child would go wrong.
"
K Here
goodness is developed from within a child*
On this same subject Kirkpatr ick says, "the caild is at
'Koffta, ilurt, The growth of trie Uin&, p. 345
'"Brightman, E. B, , The Personal relation Between God end
Children, Religious Education, February, 1921,
p. 27

first neither moral nor immoral, but immoral. What he
comes to hold as right or wring is due to experience end
training.
"
1
If the churches of a hundred years ago had any in-
terest in children, it was baaed on the first theory.
Their principal object was to save sinners and they had
no place in their program for a child who had not yet
sinned. They saved adults from Hell, hut were not con-
cerned with the saving of children to heaven. When lay-
:.en took it upon themselves to estat>lis;i Sunday schools
for the teecning of religion to children they met oppo-
sition from the Church. x.ie Sunday ocaools were based
on the second and tuird theories given above. Practically
every Caurch today recognizes the truth of these theories
and as a result there is a widespread interest in Re-
ligious Education for children. The Churches recognise
also the value in giving a child the right ideas from the
ver^ beginning, rather than attempting to soend years later
correcting wrong ideas.
There are man.y elements which ent^-r into the lormation
of mental attitudes. Two children cental attitudes
may have similar instruction in
school ; nd live in practically identical environments and
'ilirhpa trick, S, A., Fundamentals of Child Study, pp. 161-2
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yet have very different likes and dislikes. In consid-
ering the various configurations which, enter into the
formation of the large! configuration, the mental atti-
tude, it is important to consider them in their relation
to the whole attitude. Unless they are related to the
whole situation they become meaningless unite.
The basis elements in the formation of mental attitudes
are cosmic and mechanical forces. Cosmi c Force s
These would include the laws of motion, atmospheric condi-
tions, light and heat, etc. Nq cannot transfer an indi-
vidual from the real world to an ideal one, even if we
wished, ar.d it is therefore necessary to take into consid-
eration ways in which the individual is influenced "by nis
environment.
In the second place all animal behavior is greatly
influenced by instincts. Instinctive Ins tin cts
activity is directed taward a goal,
although we cannot assume that all animals are aware of what
that goal is. Human instinctive behavior, as well as that
of higher animals, might be said to be purposive or teleo-
logical in character. Psychologists who object to the use
of instincts as an explanation for human behavior often use
the terms "desires", "impulses" and "innate tendencies".
By whatever term tne,y are called, these innate impulses are
very important in the formation of mental attitudes, and
finally character and personality. Calloway says of them,
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"desires and impulses are at the bottom of moral and re-
ligious education. 1-hey are bad only when they outlive
taeir usefulness, or when tae.y are overused or misap-
plied. "It is almost impossible to destroy an instinct. A
much easier and more effective method is to redirect or
deepen instinctive activity.
Closely associated with instincts or innate impulses
are emotions. Th*j are more dynamic than instincts in that
tney are always expressed, unless there is a strong in-
hibitory factor present. It is much more difficult to sup-
press or even redirect emotions than instincts because of
their dynamic nature, according to the gestelt psychologists
instincts and emotions appear simultaneously, as they are
both parts of the same configuration. In the formation of
the larger configuration, the mental attitude, I would say
the instinct furnishes a goal, while the emotion furnish*)!
dynamic power.
3homaon maintains t:ere are two types of emotions--
primary and secondary. Primary emotions include fear, an-
ger
,
curiosity, surprise, etc. I think that of the primary
instincts the most powerful one is fear; at least it is the
J most powerful instinct in the formation of mental atti-
tudes. 6 child's first mental attituae is probably one of
'Galloway, T. If. , The Use of Motive* in leeching Morals, and
Religion, p. 74
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either fear or trust, as a result of his reaction to
of two or more primary emotions or primary emotions plus
instincts. A few of these compound emotions sre al-
truism, ambition, "belief and anxiety. The self-regarding
impulses and. complexes of self assertion nd submission
are fundamental and are a part of almost all compound
emotions, ihe unpleasant emotions outnumber tae pleassnt
ones, although the latter may be trained to operate more
often and with greater intensity
.
Other compound emotions are sentiment, mood, happi-
ness, unhappiness and temperament. One of the chief Dif-
ferences between individuals lies in the different methods
used to express these compound emotions. A life that is
emotionally starved is ripe for questionable adventures.
"We live for tae thrilling moments of life, we endure the
rest." Whether we are happy or unnsooy depends to a
large extent on now "we endure the rest of life". A per-
son is happy "when the sum total of his acts are aarmonizec
to produce a tense of well being, -rrd the realization of
values that are more or less permanent. The happy person,
as described by laomson, might well be compared to the
friendly and unfriendly faces. prima ry and
secondary
AmotionsThe secondary emotions consist
Thomson, H. K,
AIbid.
,
u. 113
3 Ibid.
,
p. 115.
,
Ihe Springs of Human Action, pp. 90-100
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one of the larger "unclosed" configurations described "by
Zoffka. While the configuration is not yet "closed" the
whole life of the person is tending toward a harmony,
which will in the end "produce a sense of well "being and
the realization of values that are permanent."'
Eappiness and pleasure are not identical as the first
is an emotion and the second a feel- Hgppiness
vs
ing. -'rom the standpoint of mental Pleasure
attitudes pleasure may be more important than happiness.
While we do not always pursue the objects that give us the
greatest pleasure we certainly tend in that direction. If
we do not pursue sue i objects it is because a strong in-
hibition has been set up. Pleasure and successful activity
are practically identical, and are both associated with re-
wax&Q* ihe reward need not be in the form o± a material
gift, but may be merely self satisfaction, or the attaching
of value to a certain activity. Pleasure cannot exist apart
from satisfaction in activity. In the determining a person's
mental attitude toward life as a whole I would think that
hap-, iness as trie sum total of all pleasures, or unaappiness
is trie sum total of all failures, wjuld predominate. A person
c?m ot long find pleasure in activity that fails to produce
harmony and a sense of well being.
Everyone is in love with nimself. I nave yet to find
'Thomson, .. , ihe Springs of ..umon action, p. 115
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anyone who wjuld "be willing to change places "in toto"
with another person, even if it could be done. ,;e ad-
mire other individuals, hut are satisfied to be ourselves.
It is usually a long time Eefore a caild realizes that
the world was not cheated for his special benefit, I he
self is involved in all conduct, ana the highest goal of
life is self-realization. "the distinction between a
t
selfish and un unselfish person is the nature and number
of things and ideas that are identified with the self, the
nature of the self -regarding sentiments. social pres-
sure furnishes the pattern for our lives, emotions fur-
nish the power; end experience, the materials." egotism
Irofe^sor ;,:ariatt says, "the love of one's self is
made the norm of loving someone else...- rational egoism or
a respect for self is the basis for any true altruism or
love of others. It is a splendid thing to give one's self
for otuers, but it is a more splendid thing to develop a
self worth giving. Ihat alone & ives value to the gift."'
In considering mental attitudes it is of supreme importance
that tae experiencing person be considered. If it is human
nature to be egotistic, then egotism plays an important part
in the formation of configurations. k careful stud,/ of
seemingly unselfish action will reveal in pra ctically evo-ry
instance a basic selfish configuration prompting the deed.
Thomson, II. II., Ihe springs of Human Action, p. 200
Llarlatt, Earl, Lecture hotes.
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Psychophysical conditions are also important in the
formation of mental attitudes. The Psy oho physi cal
Conditions
health of an individual must "be taken
into consideration. The mental attitude of a caild who is
tired, restless and nervous will be very different from that
of the same child when ne is rested. Thomson says of the
influence of glands on an individual, '•they determine tem-
perament, mental capacity, ambition, force of character and
even personality." Tnis is a rather brood statement and
Thomson would probably find himself in difficulty trying to
prove it; yet there can be little doubt that bodily condi-
tions do influence the mind.
Habita and autonomic acts also play their part in the
formation of mental attitudes. Thomson says Habits
further, "many organisms can get along without conscious-
ness, out no conscious "being could long survive without sn
autonomic apparatus." Habits are based on the formation of
movement melodies or configurations. They aire the founda-
tion of character. President Marsh said in his aadrees at
the Baccalaureate Service last June, "conduct is character
unfolding itself. If character is dependent to a large
extent upon habits, it follows that much of our conduct is
due to aabit.
In the foreword of the Boston Course in Citizenship
'Thomson, M. K. , The Springs of Human Action, p. 40
A Ibid.
,
p. 37
'Marsh, D. L.
,
"Higher Education Plus the highest Education"
Bostonia, XXVII, p. 69
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through Character Development, the editor says;
1. "The idesl citizen is a person of character.
2. The goal of training is to produce men and women
of the noblest character possible...
3. ^ixed principles govern attitudes and actions."'
It is difficult to change 9 habit because it neces-
sitates the destruction of a movement melody. The organism
is thrown into a state of disequilibrium, ?nd it continual-
ly tends to regain its equilibrium through the formation of
old cor:i igurations instead of new ones. Thomson says, "an
attitude is trie result of habitual modes of conduct, and
in turn becomes a determiner of future conduct in modify-
ing and regulating the primary drives. * Mental attitudes
might be considered as habits, since a former mental atti-
tude arises under favorable conditions.
The attitude of other people toward a situation tends
also to fix our mental attitudes. "It is better to be
dead than out of style", might apply as Group
Attitudes
well to mental attitudes as to current
styles, of clothes. V* shrink from being made an object of
ridicule. ?or this reason we often force upon ourselves
mental attitudes which we do not sanction, with the excuse
that "everybody's doing it", or perhaps I should say, "every-
body's thinking it".
'school Document Wo. 10-1924, Course in Citizenship Through
Character Development, p. 9
Thomson, L, E. The springs of human action, p. 166
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Knowledge must certainly be a powerful factor in
the formation of mentsl attitudes. It is probably the
most important feature in the changing of conf igurstions.
Spanking e child will never make him like the multipli-
cation table or some especially distasteful food. To be
sure spanking may result in his learning the multiplica-
tion table or eating spinach, but Knowledge
it cannot make him like either one.
V/hen he sees the value in an unpleasant task it will be-
come less obnoxious, and may e\r en become pleasant. .rear,
jealousy and contrariness often disappear when the child
understands certain situations. Without knowledge we
would be ruled entirely by instincts and emotions. .Know-
ledge enables us to see a situation as a whole and pre-
dict possible consequences, through it we can look into
the past and borrow what is valuable. ,Ve can weigh dif-
ferent situations, judge of their worth, and predict to
some degree of accuracy the future.
Attention depends very largely on knowledge. A two
year old child would not pay attention to a discourse on
the philosophy of Plato, because Plato is beyond his field
of knowledge. Xoffka says, "without the participation of
attention, learning does not take place." We pay attention
for any lengtn of time only to the thingo in which we are
'Koffka, Xurt, ihe Growth of the Mind, p. 302

76.
especially interested. "Attention is a descriptive term
telling something about a person's mental attitude."'
.Knowledge offers some very difficult problems. Jven
though we accept the theory that Problems of
Knowledge
knowledge is extremely important
in the formation of mental attitudes, the problem is only
stated and not solved. It is obviously impossible for any
one person to know everything that is known at the present
time. In addition, what is ioiown now by all individuals
is probsbly only a small fraction of the knowledge that
will ultimately be known. The real problem is, what know-
ledge ought to be taught to children to insure desirable
mental attitudes? Their mental attitudes will necessarily be
largely influenced by the knowledge they have at any
given time. A literature teacher might say desirable
mental attitudes are best developed through a study of the
best literature of the world, while a science teacher would
probably advocate the study of science. Certainly know-
ledge stimulates curiosity, develops interest, and gives a
purpose to life.
Kiss Margaret Slattery said, "the unfortunate feature
about facts is the fact th?t the.y will not be true tomorrow."
science is continually forcing us to reject facts which were
true yesterday. If we knew .Knowledge Changes
'Thomson, M. ^he oprings of human action, p. 153
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what fscts would "be true twenty years hence it would
not "be so difficult to know what to tesch children.
It was stated earlier that, due to the impression-
ability of small children, it is easier to leach the
right thing first than to try to correct a wrong idea
later. To change a wrong idea is often as difficult as
to change a habit, bince "both necessitate the breaking
down of one configuration ?nd the building up of another
one. Shall we then teach the facts we know now end hope
that the;,- will not be changed v.'ithin the lifetime of
those whom we teach? To do this would necessitate the
end of all scientific investigation because science must,
if it is to exist, continue to discover new facts which
will contradict old facts.
It is much more important, it seems to me, to teach
a child how to think than what How to la ink Re ther
Than ;,h£ t to Think
to think, 'ihe scientific atti-
tude will endure long after our present body of facts have
lost their significance. The scientific attitude eventu--
'tes in understand ing , tolerance and sympathy. It does even
more, because it gives the child an ability to think for
himself. Ililpatrick says, "we should tea ca the actual
habits required in life as the need arises, taking care al-
ways that the accompanying attitudes are the best attainable.
' xlilpatrick, <V. H. Thinking in Ciildhood and Youth, Heligious
education, j'eb. 192b, p. 13o
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There is another danger in teaching knowledge ex-
clusively. No one would "be so foolish es to think that
he knew the whole of truth ;' irst Impressions
and yet we often tesch as though our knowledge were final.
A child's mind is extremely impressionable, and many ideas
thet he receives are indilibly printed on his mind. Be-
cause of his limited experience he is credulous of every-
thing he hears end sees. I- first impressions ere lasting-
it ie obviously important that they be desirable ones.
"ISsrly training effeciently directed, can and does so fas-
ten so firmly in the young our positions, social, economic,
religious, racial and nationalistic thst thereafter under
all ordinary circumstances the bias so produced remains for
most people an effectual warping throughout life, success
at indoctrination is no guarantee of the validity of the
doctrine. It is possible to train and indoctrinate a child
in such a fashion that he will not depart from it. Success
does not mean correctness, and parents and teachers have no
guarantee of the absolute correctness of what they teach."'
Then too, we often teach children ideas which we do
not ourselves believe. How can we expect children to be
truthful to us if we are not truthful to them? There sre
taree reasons why we fail to tell trie truth to children--
lack of realization of the importance of the problem, a
'Zilpatrick, W. H.
,
IhinJcing in Cnildhood end Youth, r.eligious
education, February
,
1926, pp. 135-6
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sense that' it coes not matter very ffalse Idea s
much what a child thinks; fear on our part; and lack of
knowledge on our own part.
Ihe colleges have been blamed for almost everything,
chief of which might be mentioned the loss of religious
faith on the pert of the students. ±ae colleges cannot be
blamed for this entirely. The blame should instead be
plsced on the parents and teachers who failed, long before
the young man or woman entered college, to teach the truth.
7/hen the studer. t finds his parents and teachers have told
him things that they do not themselves believe he loses
faith in them, and in the religion they have taught him.
haveland says, "" r e cannot make religion a reality to child-
ren unless it is first a reality to us. It is foolish to
cram adult conceptions down the throat of a child. A child
may forsake the doctrines of his parents, but never their
faith. If the Bible is unreal to children it is because it
is unreal to us wno attempt to teach t.-iem.
"
It is both wasteful and dangerous to give children
false ideas. It would be difficult to say whether it is
better for a child to live in ignorance regarding the false
ideas he has been taught, or be forced to start all over
again and build up for himself a few true ideas. The first
leads to the maxim, "ignorance is bliss". The second re-
'ibtreibert, .uriel, Youth and the Bible, p . 4-5
^haveland, Lary, Character .raining in Childhood, pp. £fc9-cb2

60.
suits in the necessity to destroy existing configurations
or mental attitudes, and ma.J lead to despair and pessi-
mism. I think everyone will agree it is much more sensible
to put a lock: on the stable door before the horse is stolen.
There are perhaps a few idess that we could teach,
upon which a child could build "Why" Lore Important
Than "What"
his own faith. ihey should of
course be idea that give a wholesome mental attitude toward
life. Fairy stories have a large place in the life of a
child , but we do not want him to put everything we say in
a class with fairj- stories. A child has much more respect
for a "what" if it is accompanied by a ''why". The "why"
takee it out of the category of fairyland and gives the idea
a dynamic force which it could never have had before. The
"why" also tends to strengthen a configuration.
;.iss calkins distinguishes between faith and belief by
saying, "faith is always an active personal attitude toward
another self; belief is always an active personal attitude
toward things, events or truths... The duty to have faith is
always therefore, the obligation to identify oneself with the
persons or causes which seem the highest, and the exhortation
to faith is always, on the lips of the great teachers, an
incentive to loyalty. Thus the Lew .testament commands to
believe emphasize, always, the need or the duty of an affirm-
ing, consenting, personal attitude toward a divine self."'
' Calkins, Llary, Thirst Hook in Psychology, p. 249
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IhiB leads to the question, what kind of an attitude
toward Jod do we wish children to have? Certainly few
people would want their children to have a conception simi-
lar to that given in the story of Abraham sacrificing
Isaac, 'i'hey would not want their children to think of God
as one who commands us to do wrong in order that he may test
our faith. In addition G-od deceived Abraham, because he
commanded .--braham to do something which he did not intend
for aim to do. If we teach conceptions of God which are
lower than the moral standards of human beings, how can we
expect children to love such a God?'
Dr. Eetts says on this subject, Att itude
froward" God
"the child readily responds and ac-
cepts the idea of an unseen God. The first concepts should
however be related to the child's experience, cut they should
expand as the child grows and develops. A child of from two
to three years of age can best think of God as the giver,
protector, friendly helper, A child from four to five thinks
of Hip as a father, maker, source of goodness snd love. Dur-
ing the period from six to seven years of age s child can
best conceive of God as s creator, guide, one who approves
and condemns. Proa eight to nine God is a comrade, friend,
and judge. .Yaen a child is ten or eleven he suould be able
to think of God as eternal, ell-knowing end omni-present .
"
';..unkres, Alberta, Lecture xotes
*Betts
, G. , How the child learns to Kaon and Love God, Int'l
Journal of Religious education, Ifarch, 1928, pp. 9
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It will "be noted that this does not necessitate the
"breaking down of old conf igurs tions , but rather the en-
largement of existing configurations. pr« Setts does not
insist that his chart be followed exactly, but he does
stress the necessity of constantly enlarging a child's
conception of God.
IPew children know that religion can be dynamic, an
adventure, and is not a passive sort of a thing which must
be endured. Fosdick once said, rel igion is
!
ynamic
"faith is vision plus valor." Such an attitude toward re-
ligion would arouse enthusiasm, loyalty, love of adventure
and curiosity. In this connection it would be well to
teach children that there is often more valor shown in liv-
ing for a cause than dying for it. I can remember spending
many hours day dreaming in my childhood over the lines:
"How swe§t would be their children's fate,
If we like them should die for Thee.*
In my dreams I was alternately thrust into a den of lions
and burned at the stake, tfhen the thought came to me that
it isn't customary to do either of these things now to
people in the United States, life became dull. Often I
used to think how uninteresting religion is because we are
not called upon to make real sacrifices, nor is there any
way in which we can show real devotion for a cause. NO
one ever suggested to me that religion can be an adventrre
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in living--"vision plus valor".
At trie present time trier e is much emphasis "being
laid on the commandment, "xhou shalt love thy neighbor
as thyself." If will probably be a long time before any-
one actually lives up to this commandment. It too can
be held up to children as an adventure in living. 3uch
an attitude would lead to the practicing ox the golden
r.ule in business, the breaking down of race prejudices,
and the establishment of World Brotherhood.
j.here are many other attitudes that we would like
caildren to develop. We want them to be generous, con-
siderate, truthful, unselfish, reliable, cooperative,
fair in play, etc. ihese attitudes are only en expansion
of the right attitude toward ^od and our neighbors. If
a child has the right attitude toward God and his neigh-
bors these other attitudes will easily follow.
No single factor in mental attitudes has much mean-
ing until it is related to the configuration as a whole.
It is further impossible to isolate a single mental atti-
tude from experience. fife are constantly destroying, creat-
ing and integrating mental attitudes into a larger configura-
tion, which might be called the "sumrnum bonunr' of life. An
acceptance of gestelt psychology implies also the acceptance
of this one outstanding configuration toward waich each per-
son is striving.
•'In showing us that uestalt is not a simple function

b4
of stimulus, ^offka tells us that the process is one de-
pending not on stimulus alone, hut also on the 'attitude'
of the organism which has in readiness certain modes of
response, these physiological processes which underlie
the structural phenomena having themselves the character
of structures. Cestalt, he tells us, is a relating' of
the "movement-structure" of the organism to the stimulus."'
To be effective a child must choose his own atti-
tudes, l'hey cannot he forced attitudes Cannot
Be ?orced cm a
on him. It is the law of Per son
nature that everyone must have mental attitudes, ifhother
they are desirable or undesirable depends on the factors
I have discussed in this chapter plus many more factors I
have not mentioned. It is the task of parents and teachers
to do their share in making attitudes as desirable as
possible. Hental attitudes determine personality. In
fact personality is the sum total of all our mental atti-
tudes, //hat we are depends on our mental attitudes.
-What
our mental attitudes are depends on physical and mental
forces plus our own will power.
'?ollett, M« P., Creative Experience, pp. 93-4

PART III
CRITICISM

CHAPTER VI
rilAXi APPRAISAL 0? IKE GESTALT THEORY
For the most part Gestalt psychology is destructive.
Instead of enlarging or supplementing other current
theories of psychology it discards them and then builds
a new system. It has refused to c-ccept most of the prin-
ciples upon which the other systems of psychology are
"based. It has tossed aside associationalism, analysis,
S--R bonds, chance learning, atomism and behaviorism.
Analysis, as an important psychological method, has
been largely rejected due to the nature Analysi s
of configurations. Liss Calkins says,
"by configuration or structure is meant 8 unity which is
an undivided, articulated whole, which can neither be
made up by adding together separable, independent elements
nor reduced to sucn elementary constituents." Jloffka
believes that the whole is greater than the sum of its
parts, and thst the response made bj the organism as a
whole is very different from the sum of the responses made
by its various parts. This means that we cannot accurately
'Calkins, Kary, critical Comments on the Geetalt-Theorie
,
Psychological Review, March, 19 26, p. 136

86.
study a whole situation "by breaking it up into its
various parts end studying eac/i of them separately.
xhe fact that a "baby reacts to a complex situation
like a friendly face, even before he reacts to a simple
color stimulus is proof of the fact that the earliest
configurations are not necessarily the simplest ones.
If a baby reacts to a complex situation as a whole, it is
obviously artificial for adults to attempt to analyze
the same situation in order to understand the baby's be-
havior. Whitehead says, "awareness of nature begins in
awareness of a whole whic:i is present ... this awareness
of the whole is directly sensed and" is not a detailed
discrimination of its parts.' 1 '
Xoffka cannot be accused of entirely disregarding
analysis. The fact that he insists the descriptive ex-
periences must he considered as well as iunctional con-
cepts indicates that he considers analysis important.
It would be impossible to accurately describe an "inner"
experience without analysis. Koffka does sa;y , "if any
analysis ic to be made it must be in terms of conditions
which affect the total situation without destroying it."
He contends further tnat there can be no isolated sensa-
tions in experience, and to attempt to isolate one ex-
perience results ir] meaningless chaos. I a ree with
'Humphrey, ^eor^e, She Iheory of Einstein and the iestalt
Psychology, Am. J. of Psychology, July, 19£4, p. 55
nelson, ^arry
, The Psychology of Jestalt, Am. J. of Psychology,
July, 1925, p. 360
I
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Koffka here, as I do not see how a fraction of an ex-
perience could have any meaning unless it was related to
the rest of the experience. Those who attempt to ana-
lyze everything try to detatch the situation from the
person who experienced it, which results in an impersonal
mass of unrelated experiences. I thinic Hoffka is right
in insisting that any method which tends to disintegrate
and depersonalize an experience is artificial, and there-
fore unscientific. He does, however, advocate analysis
insofar as it does not carry the psychologist away from
the original situation. "If single acts are considered
in isolation they appear to possess no meaning so far as
the problem to be solved is concerned; "but if they are
taken in connection with the total process they are re-
lated parts of a specific whole, and therefore are intel-
ligent." !
Eofflea's objections to associationalism, 3—B "bonds
Such theories of learning pre- Associati ons! ism
5--K Bonds
elude the possibility of Chance Learning
achievement or the learning of anything entirely new.
Psychologists are gradually being forced to admit that all
learning cannot be due to mere chance and th t it is pos-
sible to le-?.rn something entirely new. Mien they do admit
'helson, Harry, ihe Psychology of Gestalt, American Journal
of Psychology, July, 19E5, p. 364
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were I not able to make a descriptive report of my "be-
havior, I should he unable to make any record of it at
all. It is therefore Impossible to remove this aspect of
behavior from science, not merely because of its immanent
significance, but also because of the intimate connection
which experience has wita the objective side of behavior."
Had the gestalt psychologists cone only one thing, viz.
refuse to accept behaviorism as the only psychological
method, I would c insider taeir contribution to psychology
important. The present tendency to reduce all activity to
observable behavior excludes such factors as conscious-
ness, mental attitudes, purposes and values.
Koffka argues that, "sensational and behavior units
portray an artificial laboratory attitude toward facts. Ob-
jects, values Bind dynamic processes are analyzed into mean-
ingless units." Miss Calkins says, "a significant feature
of Gestalt-Psychologie , at least in the form which Zoffka
e ives to it is its conception of what may be called the con-
figuring individual, i^or Oestait-Psy chologie is concerned
not only with experiences, that is, with percepts and judg-
ments and the rest, as articulate wholes, but is concerned
also with the "experiencing individual", with the conscious
'Hof fka
,
Hurt, Ihe growth of the ...ind
,
p. 17
xHelson, Harry, ihe Psychology of Jestalt, American Journal of
Psychology, July, 19£5, p. .345
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organism in reaction on its configured environment.
When we adopt trie integrative and functional 'attitude'
we "begin with the orgEn ism in its environment and study
all its reactions. Among these we may reckon also
those which are usually termed consciousness, I mean the
fact tnat the physical world exists for fcjhs organism,
as its own surrounc ings . . . and the other fact that the
organism also imows itself." Ihis concept approaches
the centered complex of Personalisja.
Along this same line I .iss Calkins gives another
criticism of Xoffka's theory. She says, "a radically dif-
ferent defect in the GestaLt-Psycnologie is its neglect
of the concept, central to its own doctrine of the ex-
periencing individual, the conscious organism, which
both knows itself and is also related, not only through
muscular contraction but through consciousness, with its
environment, iven -loffka, though he so unequivocally
asserts the existence of the experiencing individual,
,-ives ni:nself over for tne most part ihe Experiencing-
Ind iv ld ue
1
to the consideration of the ex-
periences (or exper iencings ) which are really part-pro-
cesses of the experiencing individual. he curiously over-
looks the fact that this conscious organism is itself an
Calkins, ..... Critical comments on the Sestalt-Theorie
,
Psychological review, March, 19£6, p. 139
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articulated end inte £ reted whole." This is a valid
criticism of zloffka's work, but it is one of omission
rather than contradiction. His theories certainly in-
dicate that the experiencing individual is essentiel.
Perhaps the most frequent criticism of configura-
tionists is the fact thrt they attempt to explain
physics, "biology and psychology all in terms of config-
ure t ions, kelson says, "the proponents of the con-
figurations! theories, assert their concepts apply to
physical and "biological problems as well as to purely
psychological questions, with the result that they iiave
advanced new physical and physiological hypotheses to
support their psychological views While it would be
most desirable to reduce1 these sciences to one principle
it seems to me they are so ver^ different in their as-
pects it would be impossible to explain them ell in terms
of cor.figur tions, without doing injustice to the concept
of configuration. oucn a problem is a philosophical one
rather tnen psychological. If all three sciences could be
reduced to one concept it would be a long step in the
philosopher's work.
lhe criticism advanced by I»'iss Calkins that is most
cogent in r consideration of mental attitudes is, "con-
figurations often overlook the fact that the cestalt-
'Cal^ins, ..stj
,
critical comments on the Jestalt-i heorie
,
p.
helson, nerry , j.he Psychology of cestalt, p. 343
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conception, important as it is, yet is not the only
principle of psychological description. An experience
is incompletely, however correctly ,d escribed as a con-
figuration or &esialt; end not all experiences ere effec-
tively distinguished from each other by the manner or
degree of their integration. ^motion and volition do
not differ merely or mainly as configurations either from
each other or from perception and thought... In the
'Growth of the Mind' 1 Xoffk? nowhere trer-ts, in other
than an incidental way, the teeming emotional life of
children, the rise and decadence and modification of
such basal experiences as liking and aversion, shar^e and
self -di splay ; and he virtually ignores also the child's
volitional experiences, his constantly eh.ang ing pro-
iects and ambitions." On this same subject Helson says,
"the problem of attitude still remains 2 difficult one
for conf igurat ionists in view of the fact that their own
results show that analytic attitudes may be as natural
to some as the synthetic cttitude to others." "
It seemo to me that gestalt psychologists do have a
place for mental attitudes. ihe mental attitude of a
person might be considered as the lergest configuration.
Certainly mental attitudes are l.lentr 1 At ti t uc'es
greater tnan the sum of experiences. ±hey are total pro-
cesses, having as their bases the various factors dis-
' Calkins, .... Critical comments on the Jestalt-lheorie
, p.
*Helson, harry, xhe Psychology of JesU-lt, p. ^47
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cussed in the previous chpater. The different factors,
however, can be considered onl^ in their relation to the
total configuration or attitude.
If mental attitudes are considered as col figura-
tions there is a place for de- Growth of
Ilental "TTEtiTudes
velopment. If it were impos-
sible to enlarge mental attitudes it would be useless
to study them. Koffka bays, "the primitive, disjointed,
phenomenal patterns of infancy must be replaced by an
integrated, membered and effectively composed outlook
upon the world." Io enlarge a mental attitude need not
then mean the destruction of existing configurations,
but rather integration of configurations. As our out-
look enlarges we are gradually able to see situations
more as a whole.
If new learning is possible, it would follow that
we may also acnieve new mental attitudes. Such 8 theory
gives a new impetus to edu- New Men tal attitudes
cation, and especially Religious Education. Instead of
spending most of the time trying to enlarge existing con-
figurations which are desirable, and at the same time
destroy undesirable configurations, it is possible to
build up entirely new mental attitudes. This is especial
ly important in dealing with younger children, as it
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implies that absolutely new conf igurfit ions can be
achieved
.
Koffka's theory that first configurations are not
necessarily the simplest ones Ihe f irs t
I.lentsl A 1 1 i t ud e
s
is also important. If this is
true, we may assume that a child, is capable of doing
some abstract thinking. Children often resent the fact
that adults do not give them credit for being able to
reason out hard problems. If primitive configurations
are sometimes complex, primitive mental attitudes may
also be complex. To be complex does not necessarily
mean that t ;e;/ are identical with adult mental atti-
tudes. If the child lives in a world of his own his men
tsl attitudes are probably very different from those of
adults. If a child is able to comprehend a desirable,
complex configuration, it is obviously an injustice to
the child to feed him on less desirable, simple configur
tions. «Ve cannot force n attitude on a child, but we
can give him desirable concepts from which to build his
own mental attitudes.
Configurations take account of purposes and values.
During the period of delayed Purposes and 7ali.es
response between the confronting of a situation and the
individual's response to it, a person weighs the various
possible values that may result. ;.e analyzes and tyn-
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triesizes trie various eonfigurations presented to nis
mind and finally chooses the one that in his opinion lies
the most value. Lis choice will undone tedly be largely
dominated by his highest mental attitude or t le ' summum
bonum" of his life.
'ihe Gestalt psychology has often "been ciiticized be-
cause it is too simple. Mi . A's simplicity of
Gestclt roy-
opinion is quite as valid as that chology
of Mr. B's, although there is a vast different between
them in educational opportunities and knowledge of psy-
chology. I do not think this criticism is valid, as I
have shown that configurations are largely dependent up-
on knowledge. Iwo people with unequal knowledge cannot
have the same mental attitudes about everything.
When once an individual has determined what he wsr.ts
to co, how he wants to do it, and is convinced that the
resulting value will more than compensate for the energy
expended, "all the king's horses and all the king's men"
can never stop him from realizing his purpose.

COUCIiUSIOM
In this paper I have defined the problem of psy-
chology as, "the scientific study of the "behavior of liv-
ing creatures in contact with the outer world." An
adequate psychological study includes a consideration of
functional concepts and descriptive experiences. The
behaviorist is interested only in the first, while the
gestalt psychologist takes "both into consideration.
Tae trend of evolution has evidently been upward
towsrd the mind, and behind the whole process there has
been a purpose. Progress has probably not been due
exclusively to either eugenics or environment, but rather
a convergence of the two.
Many psychologists attempt to explain all behavior
in terras of S--K bonds. Learning consists in the strength-
ening of existing bonds and the formation of new ones,
iiothing entirely new can ever be learned. In contrast
to this theory Kofffca offers the explanation that all be-
havior is due to the formation of configurations. Con-
figurations may be either "closed" or "unclosed". When a
response is "closed" all activity ceases. As long as a
response is "unclosed" activity continues in a definite
direction. It might well be compared to an "unclosed"
triangle in which the lines indicate with a relatively
high degree of certainty the direction in which the closure
is to be effected. A stimulus breaks in on a state of rest
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upsetting the equilibrium of the whole organism. rxhis
state of disequilibrium continues until closure is ef-
fected .
In the learning process the "new ore in" is of in-
creasing importance. Aa the individual becomes more de-
pendent upon the "new brain" he ceases more and more to
depend upon the "old brain".
ihe older physiological explanation for reflexive
and instinctive movements has been found inadequate. rihe
reflex arc has been considered as an innate bond between
two or more neurones. Instincts have been defined as
chained reflexes. Such an explanation cannot be accepted
because an individual seldom repeats the same activity in
identically the same way a second time. Ke makes the
same general movements, but tiie.y are not identical. In
addition instinctive behavior is purposive and is there-
fore directed toward a goal. If it were purely a mechani-
cal process the activity could not from the very first be
directed toward a goal.
A mechanistic explanation for learning is al^o in-
adequate, xhe behaviorists refuse to acknowledge the ex-
istence of consciousness, oince one of th., basic pre-
suppositions of configurations is the existence of des-
criptive concipts it is necessary to discard behaviorism
as a final explanation of all behavior. In its place
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Zoffka puts configurations. Ee defines configurations
as, "from an unlimited and ill-defined background there
has arisen a limited and somewhat definite phenomenon,
a quality." He further defines configurations as, "a
co-existence of phenomena in which each member possesses
its peculiarity only by virtue of, and in connection with
all the others." Such a definition assumes that ex-
periences from the very first are coherent, rather than
a chaotic mass of undifferentiated sensations.
There are four ways in which the mind grow*. The
earliest type of learning is motor and consists of grasp-
ing, walking, writing, etc. The second type is sensory
learning and includes vision, audition, etc. ?ew, if any
activities are purely motor or sensory, but re rather a
combination of the two. This leads to the third type of
development, viz. sensor i-motor . I have illustrated this
type of learning by the maxim, "s burnt child shuns the
fire", and also by a discussion on imitation. The highest
type of learning is ideational, characterized by delayed
responses. It is in this fourth type that human beings
excel animals. Through ideational learning we are able to
combine configurations into a coherent mental attitftde.
ihorndike explains memory and habit in terms of S--B
bonds. Since ^loffka has discarded Thorndike's theory of
learning he would have to discard also his theory for the

conservation of values achieved by learning.
j.here are four criteria for judging the presence or
absence of intelligent behavior. A.B Intelligent animal
uses insight in learning; there are few stupid errors;
knowledge car. be transferred from one situation to another
similar one; and finally learning does not consist en-
tirely in the maturation of existing bonds, but also on
the achievement of something entirely new.
-lo'hler experimented quite extensively with chimpan-
zees, he found that they were able to fulfil the criteria
for intelligent behavior. He concluded that their learn-
ing was due to the formation of configurations, since it
could not be explained in terms of existing 3--R bonds.
Learning is dependent upon habit, memory and achieve-
ment. ,Vhat a caild remembers is largely determined by
his span of attention and interest. Koffka 's laws of
learning can be explained briefly as follows: "If the
phenomena A, B, and C... asve bee:, present once or oftener
as members of a c onf iguration , and if one of these reap-
pears hile still possessed of its 'membership-character',
it will have a tendency to supplement itself more or less
definitely and completely with the remainder of the total
configuration." ".Vhen a new conf i<-,ur -ti on arises under
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fixed objective conditions, this behavior of the organ-
ism is somehow preserved. Upon repeating the objective
conditions, the configuration will accordingly arise much
easier and much swifter then it did the first time. It
will also return when the external conditions change and
are no longer so favorable as they were at first, even
though the conditions are so incomplete that they would
of themselves give rise only to a part of the whole con-
figuration .
"
.1 child lives in a world of nis own. Hie world is
.
characterized by play. Anything which looks like woii to
him is scorned. A second characteristic of his world is
the fact that he interprets all objects as being full of
life. His problem is not to breathe life. into animate ob-
jects, but rather to knock the breath out of inanimate ones
Children are neither good nor bad at birth, ihev are
potentially both, and the characteristic that predominates
is determined by experience and training.
There are a number of factors involved in the forma-
tion of mental attitudes, 'xo fully understand mental atti-
tudes it is necessary to take into consideration cosmic
forces, instinctive tendencies, emotions, the predominance
of egotistic tendencies, psychophysical conditions, habits,
mob psychology and knowledge. 'j.he last factor is undoubted
ly the most powerful, at least in the changing of mental
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attitudes. Since our knowledge is incomplete and often
incorrect it is more important to teach a child how to
think than whet to think. First impressions are stamped
indelibly on a child's mind. If they are false it is
almost impossible to change them without injuring the
mental attitude of the child. In teaching a child to
think for himself it is necessary to stress the "w/iy"
rather than the "what".
If a cnild is to have a wholesome mental attitude
toward the world, it is necessary for him to have the
right mental attitude toward God and other people. His
conception of God should be one which is continually en-
larging. If a child has the right attitude toward God
and his fellow men all other desirable attitudes will be
taken care of, for they are necessarily a part of the
two essential mental attitudes. Mental attitudes are in
the final analysis a synthesis of configurations.
Gestalt psychology is for the most part destructive.
It discards a great deal of trie analysis used by other
psychologists. In addition, associationali srn
, 3--R bonds,
chance learning and benaviorism have been found inadequate
explanations for human activity. It oecms to me, aowever,
that there are a few types of activity, such as reflexive
action, whica can still be explained best in terms of in-
nate o--R bonds.
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Koffka gives a fery limited place to the experienc-
ing individual. ihe fact that he insists on the im-
portance of descriptive concepts indicates that this de-
fect in his theory is one of omission rather than contra-
diction.
The gestalt psychologists are often criticized be-
cause they attempt to explain biology, psyenology and
physics all in terms of configurations. '±hus far they
have not found sufficient evidence that all three
sciences can be explained in one terra, without doing in-
justice to the concept of configuration. It may be that
eventually all three sciences can be combined, but that
is a problem of philosophy rather than psychology.
me gestalt psychology gives. a new meaning to mental
attitudes. According to their theory there is a place
for the growth and achievement of new mental attitudes,
xheir theory is even more important from a philosophical
point of view, as mental attitudes explained in terms of
ponf igurations , take account of purposes and values. When
a child is convinced that a certain activity is valuable,
and he has established the right mental attitude toward it,
we may be very certain that he will realize his purpose.
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